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In the past five years, sharing economy firms like Uber, Zipcar, 
Airbnb and TaskRabbit have generated both huge market valuations 
and fierce regulatory contests in America’s cities. Incumbent firms in 
the taxi, hotel, and other industries, as well as consumer protection, 
labor, and neighborhood activists, have pushed for regulations stifling 
or banning new sharing economy entrants. Sharing firms have fought 
back, using their popularity with consumers and novel political 
strategies, lobbying for freedom to operate as broadly as possible 
without government interference. But to date, both participants and 
observers of these “sharing wars” have relied on an unstated 
assumption: if the sharing firms win these fights, their future will be 
largely free from government regulation. Local governments will 
either shut sharing down, or they will leave it alone. 
 
But this assumption is almost surely wrong. If sharing firms prevail in 
the current fights over the right to operate (and indications suggest 
they will), it is unlikely that cities and states will ignore them. Instead, 
as sharing economy firms move from being upstarts to important and 
permanent players in key urban industries like transportation, 
hospitality, and dining, local and state governments are likely to adopt 
the type of mixed regulatory strategies they apply to types of firms 
with whom sharing firms share important traits, from property 
developers to incumbent taxi operators. Using tools of agglomeration 
economics and public choice, this Article sketches the future of such 
policy regimes. 
 
Specifically, local and state governments will adopt some combination 
of the following policies in addition to insisting on 
consumer/incumbent protections: (1) subsidizing sharing firms to 
encourage expansion of services that produce public goods, generate 
substantial consumer surplus, and/or minimize the need for excessive 
regulation of the property market; (2) harnessing sharing firms as a 
tool for economic redistribution; and/or (3) contracting with sharing 
firms to provide traditional government services. The future of sharing 
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economy regulation will be very different from its present, and these 
changes will pose profound legal, political, and ethical questions for 
our cities. 
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I. INTRODUCTION: LIKE UBER, BUT FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 
The rise of sharing economy firms is one of leading business stories of the 
last half-decade. Sharing firms like Uber, Lyft, BlaBlaCar, Airbnb, Zipcar, 
car2go, and TaskRabbit have received enormous investments from venture 
capital firms and other sources,1 and have been the subjects of seemingly 
endless press coverage.2 In general, sharing firms either (1) own goods or 
services that they rent to customers on a short-term basis or (2) create peer-to-
peer platforms connecting providers and users for short-term exchanges of 
goods or services.3 
Unlike previous start-up booms, sharing firms have seldom been in 
conflict with large technology firms or federal regulators.4 Instead, their 
                                                                                                                     
 1 See, e.g., Sarah Cannon & Lawrence H. Summers, How Uber and the Sharing 
Economy Can Win Over Regulators, HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct. 13, 2014), https://hbr.org/ 
2014/10/how-uber-and-the-sharing-economy-can-win-over-regulators/ [https://perma.cc/ 
9ALF-855Q] (noting sharing firms Uber and Airbnb have enormous implicit valuations); 
Tom Slee, The Secret Libertarianism of Uber & Airbnb, SALON (Jan. 28, 2014), 
http://www.salon.com/2014/01/28/the_big_business_behind_the_sharing_economy_partner/ 
[http://perma.cc/4TTC-KDYP] (discussing investments across the universe of sharing 
economy firms). 
 2 See, e.g., Alison Griswold, Airbnb’s Latest Milestone: 1 Million Homes, and 
Hardly Anyone Who Noticed, SLATE: MONEYBOX (Dec. 8, 2014, 5:48 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/2014/12/08/airbnb_has_1_million_homes_brian_ch
esky_announces_milestone_and_almost_no.html [http://perma.cc/B9LC-GMCL] (“Uber 
can hardly budge without eliciting a flood of press coverage.”); Janice Stein, “Sharing 
Economy” Benefits May Not Live Up to Hype, CBC NEWS (Dec. 11, 2014), 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/business/sharing-economy-benefits-may-not-live-up-to-hype-janice-
stein-1.2867041 [http://perma.cc/T9PS-7LLW] (“Everyone is talking about the sharing 
economy . . . [.]”). 
 3 That said, crafting a precise definition for the sharing economy remains 
problematic. See infra Part II.A. 
 4 There are, however, some conflicts looming between sharing firms and federal 
regulators. Currently, service providers employed through sharing firms, like Uber drivers, 
are classified as independent contractors, not employees. This means such workers are not 
eligible for health benefits, unemployment insurance, worker’s compensation, or retirement 
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biggest problems have come from city and state politics, where locally 
regulated “real economy” competitors and other groups have aggressively 
fought the sharing newcomers. The taxi industry claims Uber, the leading 
“ride sharing” firm, enjoys an unfair advantage because it need not purchase 
medallions or comply with consumer protection or pricing regulations.5 Hotels 
and neighborhood groups argue Airbnb, the leading “house sharing” firm, 
skirts taxes, violates lease terms, uses residentially zoned property for 
commercial purposes, and lacks safeguards for guests and operators.6 And so 
on. 
At some times and in some cities, anti-sharing lobbying has been effective, 
leading to regulations that have either barred sharing firms from entering 
entirely or forced them to change their practices substantially.7 On the whole, 
though, it has not: sharing firms have proven remarkably resistant to 
regulatory pushes to limit their growth, displaying uncanny abilities to rally 
consumers as political advocates.8 In most American cities, most of the 
important sharing economy firms are able to provide most of their services 
most of the time, and likely will be able to do so for the foreseeable future.9 
                                                                                                                     
plans, nor are they compensated for lunch breaks or vacation time. Several sharing 
economy firms already face lawsuits challenging independent contractor status under state 
law that have proceeded to a jury. See Kashmir Hill, Meet the Lawyer Taking on Uber and 
the Rest of the On-Demand Economy, FUSION (Apr. 16, 2015), http://fusion.net/story/ 
118401/meet-the-lawyer-taking-on-uber-and-the-on-demand-economy/?utm_source=facebook 
&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=socialshare&utm_content=sticky+nav [http://perma.cc/ 
Z3P9-RPWN]. The IRS might someday exercise its power to determine that such workers 
are, in fact, employees, and so must be granted such benefits and protections. See Kevin 
Roose, Does Silicon Valley Have a Contract-Worker Problem?, NYMAG.COM (Sept. 18, 
2014), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2014/09/silicon-valleys-contract-worker-problem.html 
[http://perma.cc/2KTU-FRLH]. Further, as they expand, sharing firms may also begin 
competing with national technology firms. See, e.g., TJ McCue, Nevermind Amazon Prime 
Drones, Google Has Future Delivery Vehicle with Uber, FORBES (Dec. 31, 2013), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/tjmccue/2013/12/31/nevermind-amazon-prime-drones-google-
has-future-delivery-vehicle-with-uber/ [http://perma.cc/PJU8-JPZ8] (discussing potential 
conflict with Amazon as Uber offers same-day delivery).  
 5 See, e.g., Luz Lazo, Cab Companies Unite Against Uber and Other Ride-Share 
Services, WASH. POST (Aug. 10, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/trafficand 
commuting/cab-companies-unite-against-uber-and-other-ride-share-services/2014/08/10/11 
b23d52-1e3f-11e4-82f9-2cd6fa8da5c4_story.html [http://perma.cc/H3JF-WASP]. 
 6 See, e.g., Carolyn Said, S.F. Planners Support, Toughen “Airbnb Law,” SF GATE 
(Aug. 9, 2014), http://www.sfgate.com/realestate/article/S-F-planners-support-toughen-
Airbnb-law-5677368.php [http://perma.cc/5JD7-E638] (describing criticisms of Airbnb); 
Bruce Watson, Airbnb’s Legal Troubles: The Tip of the Iceberg for the Sharing Economy?, 
GUARDIAN (Nov. 20, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/airbnb-
legal-trouble-sharing-economy [http://perma.cc/ATC8-TPQR].  
 7 See infra notes 137–39 and accompanying text. 
 8 For discussions of the political strategies of sharing firms, see infra notes 139–42 
and accompanying text.  
 9 Cf. LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE 47 (2d ed. 1979) (“[A]lmost all nations 
observe almost all principles of international law and almost all of their obligations almost 
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To date, discussion of these local “sharing wars” has embraced an unstated 
assumption: if the sharing firms survive the current fight, their future will be 
mostly free from government regulation.10 In this telling, cities will either shut 
sharing firms down, or they will leave them largely alone. 
This assumption, however, is inconsistent with how local governments 
generally behave. The industries sharing economy firms participate in—e.g., 
taxi transport, housing, hotels, and restaurants—have long been subject to 
extensive local-level policymaking. Cities subsidize firms in these industries, 
regulate them to achieve the ends of social policy, tax them, promote them to 
tourists and visitors, and rely on them to help provide government services.11 
This focus is no accident. Cities have long had both the political incentives and 
the legal powers to closely regulate activity in these sectors to ensure local 
market depth and efficient matching and to minimize effects on urban 
congestion.12 Potential residents will only be willing to pay high urban 
property prices if cities provide access to “agglomeration gains” like those 
generated by deep markets in these goods and services.13 Thus, promoting and 
regulating such industries is an essential part of urban development policy. 
The sharing economy will be no exception to this trend. Instead, as sharing 
firms permanently establish themselves in industries like transportation, 
hospitality, and consumer goods, local governments will increasingly harness 
such firms to realize nuanced urban development goals. Today, cities express 
their power over sharing firms mainly in the form of restrictions, limiting 
sharing in the name of consumer protection (or, more cynically, incumbent-
industry protection). Tomorrow, however, the interaction between the 
economic forces driving urban development and the legal powers of cities will 
mean that cities pursue a more complex set of policy outcomes. And for their 
part, sharing firms themselves will likely want more from local governments 
than to be simply let alone. Instead, they will actively pursue benefits, 
subsidies, and contracts from local and state governments. 
This Article offers three predictions about the approaches local 
governments will take toward the sharing economy in the medium-term future: 
                                                                                                                     
all of the time.” (emphasis omitted)). Henkin’s point was that the fact most international 
law is followed is more interesting than the small percentage of times international law is 
ignored, despite the ordinary focus on the latter. Similarly, the wide availability of 
“sharing” services is the story, not their occasional absence due to regulatory limits. See 
Andrew Leonard, How Uber Will Conquer America, SALON (Aug. 22, 2014), 
http://www.salon.com/2014/08/22/how_uber_will_conquer_america/ [http://perma.cc/NZJ7- 
WG96] (discussing the inevitability of the success of sharing firms to persist in urban 
markets).  
 10 A perception reinforced by the often-libertarian rhetoric of sharing gurus like Uber 
CEO Travis Kalanick and Airbnb CEO Brian Chesky. See Slee, supra note 1 (discussing 
libertarianism of Airbnb and Uber). 
 11 See infra notes 263–64 and accompanying text. 
 12 See infra notes 315–28 and accompanying text. 
 13 See David Schleicher, The City as a Law and Economic Subject, 2010 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 1507, 1558. 
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cities will (1) subsidize sharing firms to get them to enter or expand certain 
services; (2) harness sharing firms for economic redistribution; and (3) hire 
sharing firms as contractors to provide city services. The focus of this Article 
is positive, and not normative, predicting the emergence of these policies but 
not advocating for them. However, the Article will highlight both the policy 
and political reasons for these predictions and the important legal and policy 
questions that will emerge if they come to pass. 
Our first prediction is city-level subsidization. In coming years, local 
governments will increasingly shift from inhibiting sharing firms to actively 
subsidizing them, either with cash or, more likely, with in-kind benefits. To 
illuminate this possibility, we look to the model offered by a comparable 
development question: city subsidies of professional sports stadiums. 
Of the many different arguments offered to justify stadium subsidies, the 
best are that they: (1) generate substantial public goods in the form of civic 
pride and joy that teams cannot themselves capture, as well as consumer 
surplus for fanatical fans, (2) signal a city is “on the map,” thus boosting 
industries like tourism and reducing “brain drain” emigration to other, larger 
cities, and (3) can be necessary catalysts to overcome political opposition that 
otherwise blocks necessary urban improvements.14 
In many ways, these “stadium” dynamics are also applicable to sharing 
firms. By serving as exchange markets for goods, residents already own and 
that have few easily purchasable substitutes, such firms generate abnormally 
large producer and consumer surplus for participants on their exchanges. 
Sharing firms also provide the public good of generating valuable price 
information, such as house rental rates within a given city. Further, the 
presence of vibrant sharing firms can signal that a city is “on the map,” 
particularly for young, well-educated, and mobile citizens. Like stadiums, 
sharing firms can also “hack” local political blockages by bypassing—thus 
reducing—the influence of incumbent firms, neighborhood groups, and unions 
over local regulators. Subsidies to sharing firms may thus be attractive to 
citywide politicians and state leaders seeking to overcome perceived capture of 
local regulators. Moreover, unlike stadiums, sharing firms also serve to reduce 
urban “congestion,” those factors that ultimately constrain agglomeration 
gains. The density and prosperity of cities is ultimately limited by factors like 
land costs and traffic. Sharing firms can reduce such congestion by reducing 
demand for space for goods like cars or closet space for consumer goods. 
Further, the existence of sharing markets may reduce the need for governments 
to regulate in the name of ensuring surge capacity for things like parking or 
hotel space. 
Therefore, like stadiums, sharing economy firms can make strong 
arguments for receiving monetary or in-kind subsidies. This trend is already 
                                                                                                                     
 14 This is not to say that stadium subsidies are a good idea, only that these are 
powerful and frequently successful arguments for them in local politics. See infra notes 
233–38 and accompanying text.  
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emerging in some cities.15 Going forward, we predict it will be especially 
salient in cities where regulatory bodies are particularly recalcitrant, in smaller 
cities looking to signal “bigness,” in cities seeking to prop up competitor 
sharing firms where one sharing firm has gained too much market power, or in 
places where being “tech-savvy” or “politically progressive” is seen as core to 
the local ethos. While there is a theoretical case for such subsidies, cities will 
face challenges figuring out exactly when and to what degree they are 
justified, and limiting their amount to the extent of the public benefits. Further, 
there are substantial questions about which entities will have the power to 
provide such subsidies under state law and constitutions, and about whether 
certain forms of subsidies violate state constitutions. 
Our second prediction is that local governments will use sharing firms as 
means to redistribute income. Localities frequently want to engage in 
redistribution on behalf of the urban poor, or to redistribute from rich 
neighborhoods to poor neighborhoods.16 In principle, sharing firms offer a 
powerful means for doing so. Specifically, such firms allow consumers to 
avoid capital expenditures, such as when car-sharing firms like Zipcar or ride-
sharing firms like Uber make car ownership less necessary.17 Sharing firms 
also allow sellers to mitigate the costs of previous capital expenditures. For 
example, owners of electronics can offset purchase costs by lending them out 
on Zilok, while homeowners can offset costs by renting rooms on Airbnb.18 
Sharing firms also create opportunities for low-paid second jobs or piecework, 
like doing odd jobs on TaskRabbit.19 As such, sharing services hold out 
possibilities for low-income residents in search of cheap access to goods or 
secondary work opportunities. 
Today, however, sharing services are often unavailable to poor urban 
residents.20 In the future, cities will take steps to change this, regulating 
                                                                                                                     
 15 See infra notes 307–11 and accompanying text. 
 16 See Clayton Gillette, Local Redistribution, Living Wage Ordinances, and Judicial 
Intervention, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1057, 1061–62 (2007) (describing the extent of local 
efforts to redistribute income). 
 17 Mark Rogowsky, Zipcar, Uber and the Beginning of Trouble for the Auto Industry, 
FORBES (Feb. 8, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/markrogowsky/2014/02/08/viral-
marketing-car-sharing-apps-are-beginning-to-infect-auto-sales/ [http://perma.cc/D4BQ-3XL3]. 
 18 Thomas L. Friedman, Welcome to the “Sharing Economy,” N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/21/opinion/sunday/friedman-welcome-to-the-sharing-
economy.html [http://perma.cc/2DH2-MBXQ] (“More than 50 percent of Airbnb hosts 
depend on it to pay their rent or mortgage today . . . .”); Peter Ha, Zilok Allows You to Rent 
Anything from Anyone, TECHCRUNCH (Nov. 5, 2007), http://techcrunch.com/2007/11/05/ 
zilok-allows-you-to-rent-anything-from-anyone/ [http://perma.cc/526R-MTFY]. 
 19 See Natasha Singer, In the Sharing Economy, Workers Find Both Freedom and 
Uncertainty, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 16, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/17/ 
technology/in-the-sharing-economy-workers-find-both-freedom-and-uncertainty.html [http:// 
perma.cc/G7TP-C99C] (discussing the benefits and drawbacks of working in the sharing 
economy). 
 20 See infra Part IV.B. 
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sharing firms in ways that bring their redistributive potential to the fore. This 
will echo a familiar urban-economic pattern. To circumvent limits on taxing 
authority21 or to avoid negative popular reactions to tax increases, cities have 
long favored off-budget, in-kind means of redistribution. A notable 
workaround in this vein has been “exactions”—policies that condition 
approval for zoning changes on the provision of redistributive services like 
affordable housing units.22 Following this pattern, cities may condition 
approval for sharing-firm operations on the provision of in-kind redistribution, 
such as requiring cut-rate taxi service in poor areas or requiring short-term 
hiring services to give disadvantaged groups a leg up. 
As the history of exactions shows, such policies may prove highly 
controversial, risking challenges under both state laws and the Federal 
Constitution’s Takings Clause.23 And, as is the case with traditional exactions, 
cities will need to weigh carefully whether such measures are efficient means 
of achieving redistribution, and whether putting such burdens on sharing 
economy firms and users is fair, efficient, or likely to actually improve the 
welfare of the urban poor. 
Third, we predict cities will hire sharing firms as contractors to provide 
many city services, just as many have already done by replacing huge city-
owned car fleets with internal car-share programs or car-sharing memberships 
for city employees.24 In particular, cities may use sharing firms to replace 
costly capital outlays that are rarely used (think road paving machines for 
cities that seldom pave new roads) with short term, rent-as-needed 
arrangements.25 And cities may also serve as sharing economy “sellers,” 
allowing under-used resources like idle government buildings or equipment to 
be rented for cash. 
These efforts will surely face political challenges from public employees 
and existing government contractors. Further, they will face legal challenges 
under state civil service laws or regulations on government contracts.26 And 
                                                                                                                     
 21 See Erin Adele Scharff, Taxes as Regulatory Tools: An Argument for Expanding 
New York City’s Taxing Authority, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1556, 1572 (2011) (collecting state 
law limits on municipal taxing powers). 
 22 Mark Fenster, Regulating Land Use in a Constitutional Shadow: The Institutional 
Contexts of Exactions, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 729, 729–30, 734 (2007) (discussing exactions); 
Ronald H. Rosenberg, The Changing Culture of American Land Use Regulation: Paying 
for Growth with Impact Fees, 59 SMU L. REV. 177, 182 (2006) (discussing development 
impact fees). 
 23 See, e.g., Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2595 
(2013) (finding monetary exaction for building approval subject to Takings Clause review). 
 24 See infra notes 276–77 and accompanying text. 
 25 See Ben Schiller, Now Cities and States Can Get Involved in the Sharing Economy, 
Instead of Just Slowing It Down, FAST COMPANY (Aug. 6, 2014), http://www.fastcoexist.com/ 
3033971/now-cities-and-states-can-get-involved-in-the-sharing-economy-instead-of-just-
slowing-it-dow [http://perma.cc/GRM5-7RGR] (discussing possibilities for government 
use of sharing economy services). 
 26 See infra notes 316–89 and accompanying text. 
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beyond these hurdles, governments looking to set such contracts would need to 
think carefully about how to monitor sharing firms to ensure meaningful 
accountability. 
This Article outlines the economic and policy reasons why cities will take 
these three approaches to regulate the sharing economy. Our goal is both to 
descriptively sketch what the future will look like and to highlight some of the 
normative questions this future poses for local policymakers and sharing firms 
alike. To the extent that sharing firms are increasingly an inevitable part of 
some industries, governments should consider what policies towards them are 
most valuable. Consumer protection is an important policy aim, but 
governments must carefully assess if other goals—such as economic 
development or distributional equity—should take a higher priority in sharing 
regulation. And to the extent sharing firms seek to justify their enormous 
market valuations, they should start to see local governments not as a mere 
hurdle, but as a potential source of valuable contracts or other benefits. 
    
The rest of the Article is organized as follows: Part II describes the current 
sharing economy. Part III then explains the economic factors that dictate why 
cities are likely to be deeply engaged in this sector going forward. Part IV 
discusses each of three types of regulation—subsidy, redistribution, and city 
services—that will define the future of sharing economy regulation. Part V 
provides a conclusion. 
II. AN OVERVIEW OF TODAY’S SHARING ECONOMY:  
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 
Today millions of Americans rent or borrow spare rooms, cars, boats, 
clothing, and even power tools from total strangers.27 The cache of owning 
capital goods, particularly among younger consumers, is increasingly 
supplanted by the appeal of “Uber Cool”28 or joining the “Zipsters.”29 
“Sharing,” it seems, has gone mainstream. What happened? 
                                                                                                                     
 27 See John Burbank, The Rise of the “Sharing” Economy, HUFFINGTON POST (June 5, 
2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/john-burbank/the-rise-of-the-sharing-e_b_5454710.html 
[http://perma.ccZKS#-A3T5] (describing sharing communities as becoming a “bona fide 
economic phenomenon”); Cannon & Summers, supra note 1 (noting the sharing economy 
is or will soon reach a valuation of $110 billion—eclipsing that of the U.S. chain restaurant 
industry). 
 28 Fleura Bardhi & Giana M. Eckhardt, Access-Based Consumption: The Case of Car 
Sharing, 39 J. CONSUMER RES. 881, 881, 893 (2012); Richard Hytner, Has Uber Cool 
Become Uber Cunning?, FORBES (Aug. 22, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/lbs 
businessstrategyreview/2014/08/22/has-uber-cool-become-uber-cunning/ [http://perma.cc/ 
XZ9Z-VGM3]. 
 29 Bardhi & Eckhardt, supra note 28, at 881, 893. Whether anything has ever been 
less cool than the term “Zipster,” however, is an open question.  
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In this Part, we briefly sketch today’s sharing economy. We first outline 
the trends behind the phenomenon. Next, we highlight ways the sharing 
economy has already altered urban economies—and the conflicts these 
changes have caused. Finally, we illustrate these trends by describing today’s 
most prominent—and most controversial—sharing firms. 
A. What Is “Sharing”? Origins of the Disaggregation Economy 
Today’s sharing economy stems from the confluence of several demand-
side trends and most importantly, a set of supply-side technological changes.30 
On the demand side, growing ecological consciousness leads some consumers 
to choose borrowing or reusing goods over buying new ones.31 Urbanization is 
on the rise, and people in metropolitan areas can more easily find sharing and 
renting opportunities.32 Further, the Great Recession was a crucial catalyst. On 
the “consumer” side, the crash raised thriftiness and imposed credit 
constraints, creating new interest in renting over owning.33 At the same time, 
unemployment and underemployment created a large pool of “gig” workers 
available to drive for Uber, sell odd-jobs through Taskrabbit, or otherwise 
work in the sharing economy.34 
The most important change, however, has been technological. Improved 
data storage and analytics make the cost of matching buyers and sellers lower 
than ever. And with the mass spread of smartphones,35 people can access web-
based sharing services anywhere, at any time. Likewise, widespread GPS 
tracking allows for both better customer service (Uber knows where to meet 
you) and more careful monitoring (Citi Bike, New York’s bike-share service, 
                                                                                                                     
 30 For discussions of and explanations for the rise of the sharing economy, see 
generally RACHEL BOTSMAN & ROO ROGERS, WHAT’S MINE IS YOURS: THE RISE OF 
COLLABORATIVE CONSUMPTION (2010); JANELLE ORSI, PRACTICING LAW IN THE SHARING 
ECONOMY: HELPING PEOPLE BUILD COOPERATIVES, SOCIAL ENTERPRISE, AND LOCAL 
SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIES (2012); JEREMY RIFKIN, THE ZERO MARGINAL COST SOCIETY: 
THE INTERNET OF THINGS, THE COLLABORATIVE COMMONS, AND THE ECLIPSE OF 
CAPITALISM (2014); JAY WALLJASPER, ALL THAT WE SHARE: HOW TO SAVE THE 
ECONOMY, THE ENVIRONMENT, THE INTERNET, DEMOCRACY, OUR COMMUNITIES AND 
EVERYTHING ELSE THAT BELONGS TO ALL OF US (2010). 
 31 See LISA GANSKY, THE MESH: WHY THE FUTURE OF BUSINESS IS SHARING 4–5 
(2010). 
 32 Id. at 81; Bardhi & Eckhardt, supra note 28, at 884. 
 33 GANSKY, supra note 31, at 4–5; see David Brooks, The Evolution of Trust, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 30, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/01/opinion/david-brooks-the-
evolution-of-trust.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/F73J-PK4B] (discussing the cultural effect of 
the Great Recession on consumer behavior). 
 34 Singer, supra note 19.  
 35 See Aaron Smith, Smartphone Ownership 2013, PEW RES. CTR. (June 5, 2013), 
http://www.pewinternet.org/2013/06/05/smartphone-ownership-2013/ [http://perma.cc/QG2L-
UD7F] (“56% of American adults are now smartphone owners.”). Notably, this study 
found that even a majority of low-income young people had such phones. Id.  
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prevents theft by tracking bikes).36 And as scholars like Lior Strahilevitz have 
found with respect to eBay auctions, digital reputation “ratings” can form a 
functional substitute for personal trust, making more, and more credible, 
transactions possible37—if a Lyft driver has 800 “five star” reviews, a rider 
may be willing board her car even if she lacks classic indicia of 
trustworthiness, like a business license. 
Taken together, these changes gave rise to the constellation of activity 
known as the sharing economy. And rise it has. Today, the sharing sector has 
an estimated value of over $100 billion.38 Airbnb, the room rental platform, 
has a higher valuation than hotel chain Hyatt.39 Uber’s valuation equals that of 
car rental titan Hertz.40 Meanwhile, sharing startups have arisen in industries 
from boats41 to house moving42 to, apparently, marijuana delivery.43 In the 
                                                                                                                     
 36 Tina Rosenberg, Opinion, It’s Not Just Nice to Share, It’s the Future, N.Y. TIMES: 
OPINIONATOR (June 5, 2013, 9:00 AM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/ 
2013/06/05/its-not-just-nice-to-share-its-the-future [http://perma.cc/89YT-VHVF] (“When 
you are lending out your goods, you need to track them, maintain them, protect them and 
connect customers to them over and over. There were bikeshares in the 1990s, but they 
failed because they couldn’t charge users or track and secure bikes.”). 
 37 Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, “How’s My Driving?” for Everyone (and Everything?), 81 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1699, 1713–14 (2006); see also BOTSMAN & ROGERS, supra note 30, at 92. 
 38 NPR Staff, Share and Share Alike: A Time of Collaborative Consumption, NPR 
(Nov. 11, 2013), http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2013/11/11/244570695/q-
a-a-time-of-collaborative-consumption [http://perma.cc/2SAJ-NBKM] (describing the 
sharing economy as a “$100 billion opportunity”); Michelle Regner, How the World’s 
Biggest Brands Came to Love the Sharing Economy, VIRGIN (June 30, 2014), 
http://www.virgin.com/entrepreneur/how-the-worlds-biggest-brands-came-to-love-the-sharing-
economy [http://perma.cc/2SAJ-NBKM] (describing the sharing economy as valued at 
$110 billion). 
 39 Cannon & Summers, supra note 1. 
 40 See Id. And Hertz itself is now a sharing economy player, offering short-term car 
rentals in a challenge to Zipcar (now part of Avis) and car2go (owned by Daimler 
Chrysler). Mark Clothier, Can Hertz Outrun Zipcar in Hourly Car Rentals?, BLOOMBERG 
(Mar. 29, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2012-03-29/can-hertz-outrun-
zipcar-in-hourly-car-rentals [http://perma.cc/A6C6-AEX2]. 
 41 As seen in Boatbound, the “Airbnb” of boats. Vicky Hallett, Boatbound Borrows 
the Airbnb Model to Encourage People to Get Their Feet Wet, WASH. POST (July 22, 
2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/express/wp/2014/07/22/boatbound-borrows-the-airbnb-
model-to-encourage-people-to-get-their-feet-wet/ [http://perma.cc/G3G5-XWRK]. 
 42 Julian Chokkattu, Buddytruk Is a Sharing Service Like Lyft for Moving, 
TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 14, 2014), http://techcrunch.com/2014/08/14/buddytruk-is-a-sharing-
service-like-lyft-for-moving/ [http://perma.cc/8GRX-FYD9]. 
 43 For instance, “Eaze,” a purported “Uber for Weed.” Liz Gannes, I Want It, and I 
Want It Now—It’s Time for Instant Gratification, RE/CODE (Aug. 4, 2014), 
http://recode.net/2014/08/04/i-want-it-and-i-want-it-now-its-time-for-instant-gratification/ 
[http://perma.cc/V4T5-J54F]. 
912 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 76:4 
process, “sharing” has spawned popular books,44 prominent newspaper 
commentary,45 and innumerable blog posts.46 
Yet for all this attention, a central question often remains unanswered: 
What, exactly, defines the sharing economy? After all, the term “sharing” is an 
odd fit for companies making multi-billion dollar profits. And given the range 
of entities involved—from non-profit “timebanks”47 to Fortune 500 
companies48—even sharing’s boosters concede there is no one meaning of the 
term.49 
Still, a common thread is visible. Virtually everything described as part of 
the sharing economy—from Zipcar to DogVacay—relies on a single dynamic: 
a stark reduction in transaction costs that allows for radically disaggregated 
consumption.50 The sharing economy allows users to buy, sell, or donate ever-
smaller units of goods, services, or experiences. Rental companies can lend 
                                                                                                                     
 44 E.g., BOTSMAN & ROGERS, supra note 30; GANSKY, supra note 31, at 4–5. 
 45 E.g., RIFKIN, supra note 30; Friedman, supra note 18. 
 46 See, e.g., Kurt Abrahamson, The Sharing Economy: It’s About to Get Real, WIRED: 
INNOVATION INSIGHTS (Dec. 11, 2013), http://insights.wired.com/profiles/blogs/sharing-
economy-get-real#axzz3BE3LJY41 [http://perma.cc/W4W2-V5ES]; Lauren Anderson, 
Hotels Get Collaborative with a New Range of Rentals, COLLABORATIVE CONSUMPTION 
(Jan. 8, 2014, 2:04 PM), http://www.collaborativeconsumption.com/2014/01/08/hotels- 
get-collaborative-with-a-new-range-of-rentals/ [http://perma.cc/2VF8-JNKQ]; Chokkattu, 
supra note 42; Mike Hower, Uber Taps Users in Fight Against California Anti-
Ridesharing Bill, TRIPLE PUNDIT (Aug. 22, 2014), http://www.triplepundit.com/2014/08/ 
uber-taps-users-fight-california-anti-ridesharing-bill/ [http://perma.cc/4YSV-5W48]. 
 47 Erin Morgan Gore, Nonprofits Should Lead the Sharing Economy, STAN. SOC. 
INNOVATION REV. (Mar. 3, 2014), http://www.ssireview.org/blog/entry/nonprofits_should_ 
lead_the_sharing_economy [http://perma.cc/VX2L-MP98]. 
 48 Anderson, supra note 46; Heather Duncan, Looking to Save Money, Big Business 
Dives into the Sharing Economy, GUARDIAN (May 9, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/ 
sustainable-business/sharing-airlines-caterpillar-komatsu-cloud-zipcar [http://perma.cc/4DK9-
AFYS]; Regner, supra note 38. 
 49 GANSKY, supra note 31, at 16 (stating that a “Mesh,” or sharing business, is one 
whose “core offering is something that can be shared, within a community, market, or 
value chain, . . . [involving] advanced Web and mobile data networks. The focus is on 
shareable physical goods, including the materials used, which makes local delivery of 
services and products . . . valuable . . . .” (emphasis and numbering omitted)); Rachel 
Botsman & Roo Rogers, Beyond Zipcar: Collaborative Consumption, HARV. BUS. REV., 
Oct. 2010, at 30, http://hbr.org/2010/10/beyond-zipcar-collaborative-consumption/ar/1 
[http://perma.cc/7U2R-TNDK] (defining “collaborative consumption” as “systems of 
organized sharing, bartering, lending, trading, renting, gifting, and swapping. Collaborative 
consumption gives people the benefits of ownership with reduced personal burden and cost 
and also lower environmental impact . . . .”); Rachel Botsman, The Sharing Economy 
Lacks a Shared Definition, COLLABORATIVE CONSUMPTION (Nov. 22, 2013), 
http://www.collaborativeconsumption.com/2013/11/22/the-sharing-economy-lacks-a-shared-
definition/ [http://perma.cc/YA9V-KSJB]. For some candidates, however, see ORSI, supra 
note 30, at 7 (“A sharing enterprise is aimed at sharing and offsetting the costs of 
ownership and maintenance of an item . . . .”). 
 50 See BOTSMAN & ROGERS, supra note 30, at 126–27. 
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cars for thirteen minutes at a time, and drivers can seamlessly take advantage. 
Workers can offer exactly three hours a week of furniture assembly services, 
and IKEA-toting yuppies can easily hire them. Individuals need not commit to 
running a “bed and breakfast,” complete with license, advertising, and 
insurance. Instead, they can open their home for precisely five nights a year 
and find trusting—and trustworthy—guests. It is this disaggregation revolution 
that defines the sharing economy and that drives the dynamics we consider in 
the balance of this Part. 
One note: our overview focuses only on the exchange of physical goods or 
services that must be provided in person. Sharing entities taking other forms, 
such as money lending groups, implicate a qualitatively different set of 
concerns, and so are not considered in this Article. With this caveat in mind, 
we can now turn to the sharing economy and, in particular, consider the two 
main types of sharing firms. 
B. How Do People “Share”: Structures of the Sharing Economy 
Under the wide umbrella of the sharing economy, two broad categories of 
entities have emerged: asset hubs and peer-to-peer networks. 
1. Asset Hubs: Rise of the Microrental 
Asset-hub firms involve a single “hub” entity selling access to physical 
assets that it directly owns. Zipcar is a paradigm asset hub: the firm owns a 
large vehicle fleet, which it loans to drivers on a per hour basis.51 Not all asset 
hubs are for-profits. Consider municipally-provided bike sharing, like Paris’s 
Velib52 or Washington D.C.’s Capital Bikeshare,53 through which 
governments or public–private partnerships own fleets that they rent to bikers 
by-the-hour. In places from Paris to Buffalo, this model has even been 
extended to city-provided car sharing.54 
In many ways, this asset-hub paradigm merely modernizes a traditional 
business model. After all, hotels and rental car companies purchase costly 
physical assets (buildings, cars) and then rent them out in whole or in part for 
brief periods of time. 
What makes the new crop of asset hubs different, however, is the degree 
of disaggregation now possible. Before GPS tracking, remote locking, and 
                                                                                                                     
 51 Id. at 74. 
 52 See VELIB, http://en.velib.paris.fr/ [http://perma.cc/X75W-4QHR]. 
 53 See CAPITAL BIKESHARE, http://www.capitalbikeshare.com/ [http://perma.cc/ 
XV4U-MTQK]. 
 54 However, Paris’s public–private Autolib does face competition from private car-
sharing firms like Drivy. Katie Fehrenbacher, Car-Sharing Services Take Paris by Storm, 
BLOOMBERG (June 28, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2013-06-28/car-
sharing-services-take-paris-by-storm [http://perma.cc/B7FS-96J6]. 
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online reservations, it was not viable to rent bikes or cars by the minute from 
unmanned terminals. Now it is. 
Still, the basic idea is not radically different from established business 
practices, a fact that might explain why “traditional” companies have often 
embraced asset-hub models of their own. Avis, for example, recently bought 
Zipcar,55 while Daimler AG started car2go, a challenger that allows “one-
way” rentals-by-the-minute of tiny Smartcar Fortwos.56 
Asset-hub sharing firms have occasionally caused controversy, most often 
due to their impact on resource use. For example, cities that allocate parking 
spaces or civic property for asset-hub users have sometimes drawn opprobrium 
from disaffected neighbors.57 Relatedly, businesses undermined by the entry 
of asset hubs have complained about the level of public subsidies such 
ventures receive.58 On the whole, however, asset hub firms have drawn 
nowhere near the controversy of the second branch of the sharing economy. 
                                                                                                                     
 55 John Kell, Avis to Buy Car-Sharing Service Zipcar, WALL STREET J. (Jan. 2, 2013), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324374004578217121433322386 [http:// 
perma.cc/AAC7-7J52].  
 56 A “one-way” car rental does not require returning the car to its initial parking 
space. Chris Reidy, Zipcar Rolls Out One-Way Service with Guaranteed Parking, BOS. 
GLOBE (May 2, 2014), http://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2014/05/01/zipcar-test-one-
way-car-sharing/5WkDIkVEwtK4B2m2CF6NhK/story.html [http://perma.cc/PS3W-4LRA]. 
 57 The most famous example of this response is Wall Street Journal editorial page 
editor Dorothy Rabinowitz’s ill-tempered rant against Citi Bike. Dorothy Rabinowitz, 
Opinion, Video: Death by Bicycle, WALL STREET J. (May 31, 2013), http://live.wsj.com/ 
video/opinion-death-by-bicycle/C6D8BBCE-B405-4D3C-A381-4CA50BDD8D4D.html#! 
C6D8BBCE-B405-4D3C-A381-4CA50BDD8D4D [http://perma.cc/HW3F-ZBYQ]; see 
also Ben Fried, Judge Rejects Plaza Hotel’s Citi Bike Lawsuit, STREETSBLOG (Apr. 29, 
2014), http://www.streetsblog.org/2014/04/29/judge-rejects-plaza-hotels-citi-bike-lawsuit/ 
[http://perma.cc/PU7Y-HN9R] (discussing failed litigation challenging the location of Citi 
Bike docks); Karen Klinger, City Plan to Allow Residential Zipcar Parking Sparks 
Controversy, CAMBRIDGE COMMUNITY TELEVISION (May 21, 2009), 
https://www.cctvcambridge.org/node/18076 [https://perma.cc/6MA9-VQ9T] (discussing 
criticism of zoning change to allow Zipcar parking in residential areas on the grounds that 
users will be “coming and going at all hours of the day and night,” and will cause the loss 
of parking spaces for residents); Jessica Kwong, SFMTA Board Expands Locations for 
Care Share Vehicles, S.F. EXAMINER (June 26, 2014), http://archives.sfexaminer.com/ 
sanfrancisco/sfmta-board-expands-locations-for-car-share-vehicles/Content?oid=2832120 
[http://perma.cc/MQ3Y-HE9D] (discussing criticism of San Francisco decision to give 
parking spaces to car-sharing firms on the ground that there is limited parking available).  
 58 See Danielle Tcholakian, Citi Bike Drove Me Out of Business, West Village Bike 
Shop Owner Says, DNAINFO (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.dnainfo.com/new-york/ 
20141120/west-village/citi-bike-drove-me-out-of-business-west-village-bike-shop-owner-says 
[http://perma.cc/CUA3-UCMW] (discussing now-out-of-business bike shop that blamed 
Citi Bike for lost business). 
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2. Peer-to-Peer Sharing Networks: Share and Share Alike 
The second major sharing paradigm is that of the peer-to-peer network. 
Peer-to-peer networks connect many would-be sellers or workers with many 
would-be buyers or employers. These networks can include either assets or 
services or both. In terms of assets, firms like Airbnb connect people with 
vacant rooms or houses to people looking for short-term stays. LiquidSpace59 
and ShareDesk60 provide the same service but for office space, while Parking 
Panda61 does the same but for parking spots. Meanwhile, companies like Zilok 
connect owners of consumer goods like costly power tools with individuals 
who want to rent them.62 On the service side, firms like TaskRabbit63 connect 
workers looking for quick gigs like building IKEA furniture with one-off 
employers interested in hiring. And perhaps most famously, services like 
Uber,64 Lyft,65 and Sidecar66 connect different types of motorists—from 
“black car” limousine drivers to ordinary car owners—with riders seeking taxi 
services. 
Some peer-to-peer networks operate for free or as non-profits. Non-profit 
time banks, for example, connect community members looking to trade jobs-
for-jobs (e.g., you paint my fence, I’ll water your garden).67 Likewise, services 
like Craigslist connect would-be buyers to would-be sellers without, generally 
speaking, charging a fee.68 
Many sharing platforms, however, have become big businesses. 
Companies like Uber, Lyft, and Airbnb make it easy to exchange goods and 
services and offer to backstop and insure transactions among users.69 In 
exchange, they collect a “broker’s fee” on each peer-to-peer transaction. This 
model has created huge customer bases and big profits. It has also bred 
substantial controversy: proponents laud such network firms for creating new 
                                                                                                                     
 59 See LIQUID SPACE, https://liquidspace.com [https://perma.cc/H2BT-RR58]. 
 60 See SHAREDESK, https://www.sharedesk.net [https://perma.cc/QB4S-72R7]. 
 61 See PARKING PANDA, https://www.parkingpanda.com [https://perma.cc/TQ57-PH3Z]. 
 62 Ha, supra note 18. 
 63 See TASKRABBIT, https://www.taskrabbit.com [https://perma.cc/7FLS-V9T]. 
 64 See UBER, https://www.uber.com [https://perma.cc/RT2C-6CYZ]. 
 65 See LYFT, https://www.lyft.com [https://perma.cc/BVL2-EZMZ]. 
 66 See SIDECAR, https://www.side.cr [https://perma.cc/EQP9-NN4T]. 
 67 Grace Edquist, The Sharing Economy Is Here to Stay, MADISON MAG. (Dec. 18, 
2013), http://www.channel3000.com/madison-magazine/business-city-life/The-Sharing-Economy-
Is-Here-to-Stay/30728184 [http://perma.cc/33DB-T4ZY]; Gore, supra note 47. 
 68 Except for job postings in many markets, brokered apartments in New York, tickets 
by dealer, therapeutic services, and cars and trucks. See All Craigslist Postings Are Free, 
Except for:, CRAIGSLIST, http://www.craigslist.org/about/help/posting_fees [http://perma.cc/ 
5USV-W6TK].  
 69 See Watson, supra note 6. 
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markets in previously untraded sectors,70 for bypassing sclerotic competitors,71 
and for opening new opportunities for the underemployed.72 Critics, 
meanwhile, slam them for exploiting “desperate” employees,73 flouting local 
regulation,74 and claiming vast profits under the guise of community 
collaboration.75 Yet despite, or perhaps because of, this controversy, such 
firms have become highly influential.76 
3. Why Is the Sharing Economy Important?  
The Economic Effects of “Sharing” 
Asset hubs and peer-to-peer networks differ in many respects, but both 
result from the same force: radical disaggregation of consumption. 
Accordingly, both have overlapping ramifications for America’s cities. One 
need not overstate the effect such companies are having—they are still just a 
small part of urban economies. Yet in just a few years, these firms have 
already had several important impacts. 
                                                                                                                     
 70 Tomio Geron, Airbnb and the Unstoppable Rise of the Share Economy, FORBES 
(Feb. 11, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tomiogeron/2013/01/23/airbnb-and-the-
unstoppable-rise-of-the-share-economy/ [http://perma.cc/77AN-W22K]. 
 71 John Kartch, Uber Battle of New Orleans Pits Old Guard vs. New, FORBES (July 
22, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/johnkartch/2014/07/22/uber-battle-of-new-orleans-
pits-old-guard-vs-new/ [http://perma.cc/MSB3-9YFH]. 
 72 Singer, supra note 19. 
 73 See Kevin Roose, The Sharing Economy Isn’t About Trust, It’s About Desperation, 
NYMAG.COM (Apr. 24, 2014), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2014/04/sharing-
economy-is-about-desperation.html [http://perma.cc/NJ9B-ADUB]. 
 74 Dean Baker, Don’t Buy the “Sharing Economy” Hype: Airbnb and Uber Are 
Facilitating Rip-Offs, GUARDIAN (May 27, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/ 
commentisfree/2014/may/27/airbnb-uber-taxes-regulation [http://perma.cc/4C9A-W8HN]. 
 75 Andrew Leonard, “Sharing Economy” Shams: Deception at the Core of the 
Internet’s Hottest Businesses, SALON (Mar. 14, 2014), http://www.salon.com/2014/03/14/ 
sharing_economy_shams_deception_at_the_core_of_the_internets_hottest_businesses/ 
[http://perma.cc/8E5H-T55M].  
 76 Of course, at least some of these conflicts are implicated in any context where 
regulated incumbents must compete against less-regulated newcomers. Recent years offer 
prominent examples including tensions between Amazon and conventionally regulated 
(and taxed) booksellers and between PayPal and conventionally regulated (and taxed) 
financial institutions. See ERIC M. JACKSON, THE PAYPAL WARS: BATTLES WITH EBAY, THE 
MEDIA, THE MAFIA, AND THE REST OF PLANET EARTH 141–65 (2004); Kyung M. Song, 
Amazon Lobbies Heavily for Internet Sales Tax, SEATTLE TIMES (Sept. 7, 2013), 
http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2021778597_amazonlobbyingxml.html [http://perma.cc/ 
2W2D-Y5TV].  
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a. The End of Idle Capacity: Platforms for Trading the Use of Existing 
Goods and Services 
Idle capacity surrounds us. The average power drill is used only 13 
minutes a year, spending the other 525,587 on the shelf.77 The average car is 
used only an hour a day, lying idle for 23.78 There are almost three parking 
spaces per vehicle in the United States, leaving huge amounts of land 
unused.79 And at any given time, millions of underemployed workers are idle, 
eager to trade labor for pay.80 
The sharing economy—the disaggregated economy—absorbs idle 
capacity. If someone cannot use her boat on a nice day, she can lend it out on 
BoatBound.81 If a housemate leaves town for the week, her room can be rented 
on Airbnb.82 And if someone has a free half-day, she can run errands for cash 
on TaskRabbit.83 Rather than owning a bike and leaving it unused for most of 
the week, consumers can instead rent one from a city-owned bike-share when 
they need it.84 In sum, the sharing economy means goods and people can be 
employed more intensively than before, making already existing products and 
service providers more valuable. 
To understand how this works, it is important to understand that sharing 
platforms create and serve “two-sided” markets: their users include both 
market-buyers and market-sellers. Examples include Uber, which serves 
drivers and riders; Airbnb, which serves homeowners and renters; and 
DogVacay,85 which serves pet-owners and pet-sitters. 
In general, two-sided platforms are created to mitigate coordination 
problems between buyers and sellers.86 Stock exchanges are the classic case: 
                                                                                                                     
 77 Friedman, supra note 18. This has led some to suggest libraries ought to rent out 
drills. Matthew Yglesias, Power Tools: The Libraries of the Future, SLATE: MONEYBOX 
(July 3, 2012, 5:34 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/2012/07/03/power_tools_ 
the_libraries_of_the_future.html [http://perma.cc/CXQ6-99NR]. 
 78 See April Rinne, How Shareable is Your City?, COLLABORATIVE CONSUMPTION 
(Oct. 25, 2013), http://www.collaborativeconsumption.com/2013/10/25/how-shareable-is-
your-city/ [http://perma.cc/7K4U-YLR4]. 
 79 David Biello, No Such Thing as a Free Parking Spot, SCI. AM. (Jan. 9, 2011), 
http://www.scientificamerican.com/podcast/episode/no-such-thing-as-a-free-parking-spo-11-
01-09/ [http://perma.cc/TJQ2-QF4J]. 
 80 Rinne, supra note 78. 
 81 See Hallett, supra note 41. 
 82 See id. 
 83 See TASKRABBIT, supra note 63. 
 84 See supra notes 52–53 and accompanying text. 
 85 DOGVACAY, https://dogvacay.com [https://perma.cc/H792-3DKY]. 
 86 David S. Evans & Richard Schmalensee, The Industrial Organization of Markets 
with Two-Sided Platforms, 3 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 151, 154 (2007) (“Generally, one 
can think of two-sided platforms as arising in situations in which there are externalities and 
in which transactions costs, broadly considered, prevent the two sides from solving this 
externality directly.”). 
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sellers of stock need deep, liquid markets in purchasers, buyers need the same 
in sellers, and a third-party exchange can efficiently unite the two. Two-sided 
markets permeate our economy: examples range from newspapers that target 
both readers and advertisers to singles’ bars that target both men and women.87 
In the sharing context, this two-sided structure has important 
ramifications. First, two-sided platforms can generate useful information 
whose value the platform itself cannot capture.88 For instance, the price of 
trades at a stock exchange offers valuable information to the public—whether 
or not they are exchange members. So, too, in the sharing economy: Airbnb 
rental prices are useful information for anyone looking to rent out their flat, 
irrespective of whether they are Airbnb customers. The result is a classic 
public good: non-rival, non-excludable information, which makes the 
exploitation of resources easier for customers and non-customers alike. 
Additionally, for users, two-sided sharing platforms can generate vast 
producer and consumer surplus, since they allow already-existing assets to be 
traded in new ways. Many people already own cars, parking spaces, power 
tools, or houses, and use sharing services to reduce the cost of such ownership. 
And while the marginal seller may be a professional, investing in goods 
exclusively to rent them on sharing platforms, there are large populations of 
infra-marginal sellers that gain vast producer surplus when sharing firms enter 
the market. Further, there are few easy substitutes for some of the services the 
sharing economy enables, such as hourly rentals of cars or daily rentals of 
children’s toys. This means new sharing firms leave high-demand consumers 
much better off—in sum, a major increase in consumer surplus. 
Apart from surplus effects, two-sided platforms characteristically have 
complex economies of scale. Sharing firms are no exception: on one hand, 
there are intuitive economies of scale due to the high fixed cost of developing 
sharing platforms compared to the minimal cost of adding members. This is 
doubly true because each new “buyer” makes the market more valuable to the 
“sellers,” and vice versa.89 However, two-sided markets also risk 
diseconomies of scale since, as more members join, it becomes more difficult 
for participants to identify high-value matches. In a city with thousands of 
available options on Airbnb, finding ones that match particular needs becomes 
more difficult. Accordingly, the optimal size of sharing platforms may be 
difficult to determine. 
Further, two-sided platforms may take actions that look anticompetitive 
but are ultimately not: for instance, pricing below cost on one side of the 
                                                                                                                     
 87 Marc Rysman, The Economics of Two-Sided Markets, 23 J. ECON. PERSP. 125, 128, 
130–31 (2009). The article that began research into two-sided markets is Jean-Charles 
Rochet & Jean Tirole, Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets, 1 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 
990, 990 (2003). For a nice summary of this literature, see Evans & Schmalensee, supra 
note 86.  
 88 See Paul G. Mahoney, The Exchange as Regulator, 83 VA. L. REV. 1453, 1456 
(1997).  
 89 Evans & Schmalensee, supra note 86, at 155. 
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market to attract entrants on the other side.90 Notably, sharing firms like Uber 
already appear to engage in this practice—charging cut-rate fares for 
passengers to build a larger customer base for drivers.91 Among other 
consequences, this means traditional tools for regulating competition may need 
to be adjusted for the sharing-economy context. 
b. From Commitment to Choice: Markets for Non-Professional Services 
and Non-Commercial Goods 
Another related change wrought by the sharing economy is highlighted on 
the Zipcar website: “Today’s a BMW Day . . . or is it a Volvo day?”92 This 
glib advert carries an important truth: with reduced transaction costs, sharing 
firms make it easier than ever to eschew commitment to products or services. 
Instead of renting a given office, freelancers can choose space in different 
places on different days through Sharedesk. In place of hiring employees, 
bosses can farm out discrete jobs through TaskRabbit or Wonolo.93 
This flexibility offers benefits, from the freedom to work unconventional 
schedules94 to the ability to access more, and more varied, consumer goods.95 
It has always been possible to buy a high-fashion outfit, to retain a personal 
chef, or to rent monthly parking spaces. But before sharing platforms, it was 
infeasible to match owners of high-fashion outfits with people needing clothes 
for a single event, personal chefs with people paying for a single at-home 
dinner, or prime parking spaces with drivers seeking a single night’s parking. 
The sharing economy, however, makes such transactions commonplace. 
Further, it allows anyone with a car to offer rides—not just licensed livery 
drivers; anyone who has a kitchen to sell meals—not just chefs with the capital 
                                                                                                                     
 90 Id. at 173–74.  
 91 Rafi Mohammed, Regulation Is Hurting Cabs and Helping Uber, HARV. BUS. REV. 
(July 9, 2014), https://hbr.org/2014/07/regulation-is-hurting-cabs-and-helping-uber/ [http:// 
perma.cc/DGG3-WQE3]. 
 92 MARK PETERSON, SUSTAINABLE ENTERPRISE: A MACROMARKETING APPROACH 228 
(2013). 
 93 See Noam Scheiber, Corporate America Is Using the Sharing Economy to Turn Us 
Into Temps, NEW REPUBLIC (Nov. 23, 2014), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/ 
120378/wonolo-temp-worker-app-shows-scary-future-sharing-economy [http://perma.cc/ 
3DCU-NEYF] (discussing sharing economy apps for labor). 
 94 Singer, supra note 19. 
 95 BOTSMAN & ROGERS, supra note 30, at 105 (discussing toy sharing and the need to 
sanitize toys after each use); Patricia Marx, The Borrowers: Why Buy When You Can 
Rent?, NEW YORKER (Jan. 31, 2011), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/01/31/ 
the-borrowers [http://perma.cc/8S2F-2NQ8] (profiling the rise of high-end dress rental 
service “Rent the Runway”). 
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and reputation to start a restaurant. Thus, the sharing economy effectively 
opens the “bottom” of the market for many goods and services.96 
This lack of commitment, however, also carries costs. Traditional 
guarantees of stability for workers, such as pensions or 401(k) accounts, are 
often unavailable in these “choice-friendly” markets.97 Meanwhile, consumers 
and vendors alike are often less experienced and less professionally qualified 
than before. If an Airbnber rents out her home for just three nights a year, she 
likely will not invest in developing substantial inn-keeping skills. Likewise, 
goods rented on Zilok98 will not have the same quality guarantees as those 
sold at BestBuy. The result is an increased risk to consumers, as seen in 
several high profile (though rare) lapses in “quality control.”99 
4. When Have Problems with the Sharing Economy Emerged? The 
Policy Content of Today’s “Sharing” Conflicts 
Given these forces, the sharing economy has generated several 
characteristic controversies. For our purposes, the most important such 
conflicts are those implicating (1) heightened use intensiveness and (2) the rise 
of non-professional workers. 
a. Use Intensiveness and Local Regulation 
The first set of controversies caused by the sharing economy stems from 
the decline in idle capacity. Much local regulation, from parking minimums to 
zoning law, is based on traditional assumptions on how civic resources should 
be used. Some homeowners constantly have guests over; most do not. Some 
cars are driven twelve hours a day; most are not. The sharing economy flips 
many of these assumptions on their heads, leading to more intensive resource 
uses than originally expected. 
                                                                                                                     
 96 Which is to say, presumably lower quality goods are now available for sale at 
cheaper prices. That said, as the above examples show, whether the quality is actually 
lower is debatable.  
 97 See Moira Herbst, Let’s Get Real: The ‘Sharing Economy’ Won’t Solve Our Jobs 
Crisis, GUARDIAN (Jan. 7, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jan/ 
07/sharing-economy-not-solution-to-jobs-crisis [http://perma.cc/S93S-ZRZS]; Slee, supra 
note 1. 
 98 See ZILOK, http://us.zilok.com [http://perma.cc/7D2N-VUTW]. 
 99 E.g., Jay Barmann, Airbnb Squatters Leave Palm Springs Condo in Dead of Night, 
SFIST (Mar. 17, 2014), http://sfist.com/2014/08/21/airbnb_squatters_leave_palm_springs.php 
[http://perma.cc/8W5A-5NAT] (describing Airbnb users who invoked tenant protections to 
overstay in rental for approximately three months); Austin Carr, The Secret to Airbnb’s 
Freakishly Rapid Orgy Response: “Scenario Planning,” FAST COMPANY (Mar. 17, 2014), 
http://www.fastcompany.com/3027798/the-secret-to-airbnbs-freakishly-rapid-orgy-response-
scenario-planning [http://perma.cc/9KFT-F6G3] (describing Airbnb’s reaction to renter’s 
unauthorized use of apartment for an adult “swingers” party). 
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A clear example of such conflict stems from the rise of Airbnb, 
OneFineStay100 and VRBO,101 services permitting owners and tenants to rent 
out rooms for short-term stays. Because many of these properties constantly 
have “guests,” they use neighborhoods more intensively than originally 
planned for.102 The upshot is that areas once zoned as residential can become 
de facto commercial “hotel” districts. Because of this, neighbors to Airbnb 
renters have often lodged complaints under zoning, landlord–tenant, or 
contract law.103 
On this point, some fear that as building owners gain a new, more-
intensive means of making profit (namely, renting rooms for highly profitable 
short-term stays), housing stock is being taken off the long-term rental market 
and converted to “hotel stock” for tourists,104 exacerbating affordable housing 
shortages in space-starved places like San Francisco and Manhattan.105 
                                                                                                                     
 100 See ONEFINESTAY, http://www.onefinestay.com [http://perma.cc/25BS-VTGH]. 
 101 See VRBO, http://www.vrbo.com [http://perma.cc/3YZS-QS6T]. 
 102 Sometimes, much more intensive uses. Brittany Levine, Airbnb “Party House” in 
Glendale Shut Down After Police Visits, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/ 
local/lanow/la-me-ln-airbnb-party-house-glendale-20140106-story.html [http://perma.cc/ 
2RZW-9TCA]; Dana Sauchelli & Bruce Golding, Hookers Turning Airbnb Apartments 
into Brothels, N.Y. POST (Apr. 14, 2014), http://nypost.com/2014/04/14/hookers-using-
airbnb-to-use-apartments-for-sex-sessions [http://perma.cc/EA2H-8SCN]. 
 103 See infra notes 167–71 and accompanying text. 
 104 See, e.g., Rachel Monroe, More Guests, Empty Houses: Airbnb Is Great for 
Tourists. Is It Great for the Housing Market?, SLATE (Feb. 13, 2014), http://www.slate.com/ 
articles/business/moneybox/2014/02/airbnb_gentrification_how_the_sharing_economy_dri
ves_up_housing_prices.html [http://perma.cc/82FQ-WZKC]. 
 105 E.g., Editorial Bd., The Dark Side of the Sharing Economy, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 30, 
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/01/opinion/the-dark-side-of-the-sharing-economy 
.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/A7BD-PXPT]; Miranda Neubauer, NYC Politicians and 
Advocacy Groups Say Airbnb Misrepresents Sharing Economy, TECHPRESIDENT (Sept. 12, 
2014), http://techpresident.com/news/25269/nyc-politicians-and-advocacy-groups-say-airbnb-
misrepresents-sharing-economy [http://perma.cc/M69S-HR58]; Ben Fox Rubin & Joan E. 
Solsman, Vexed in the City: San Francisco Strife Spurs Tech Defectors Elsewhere, CNET 
(Aug. 22, 2014), http://www.cnet.com/news/vexed-in-the-city-san-francisco-strife-spurs-
tech-defectors-elsewhere [http://perma.cc/9KXQ-KHHE]. For what it’s worth, this 
argument is somewhat strange. Airbnb et al. make owning a home more valuable, as they 
allow spare capacity (rooms or time) in a home to be rented by others (or, if it is used 
entirely as a hotel room, to divide its use among renters who are willing to pay more for it). 
The ability to rent out space in apartments will increase the cost of housing, but only for 
the same reasons that reductions in crime rates, great new parks, or anything else positive 
increases the cost of housing—it increases demand. Using public policy to depress demand 
for housing, whether it is by barring house sharing, or by not stopping crime, is an odd 
policy response to say the least. The very goal of such a policy is to destroy wealth by 
making houses less valuable. It is far more reasonable to encourage increases in demand 
but change land use policy to allow more housing construction to meet the increase in 
demand, muting price increases. Further, suppressing Airbnb on the basis of its effect on 
housing prices will reduce local property tax revenue available for redistribution. 
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Other examples abound. It has always been possible to ride and park a 
bike in New York. Yet residents protest the placement of bike-share hubs 
because they cause more foot-traffic and volume than previously planned 
for.106 It has always been possible to use public parking for as long as legally 
permitted, but far more people do so when such spaces can be electronically 
re-rented to the highest bidder.107 
Relatedly, some fear the sheer volume of sharing-firm users allows the 
collection of data in ways that threaten personal privacy. Cab companies and 
rental car companies could have comprehensively tracked their customers, but 
it would have been practically infeasible to do so. Not so with sharing firms. 
Zipcar and car2go automatically track where and when their customers drive, 
while the most controversial data-collector, Uber, has vast amounts of 
information about users’ travel habits and, by extension, their private lives.108 
b. Regulating Non-Professional Services and Non-Commercial Goods 
A second conflict stems from the massive rise of non-professional—and 
non-regulated—service and goods providers that the sharing economy has 
enabled. This trend creates particular tension when professionalized and 
regulated incumbents complain of unfair competition. In the taxi industry, for 
example, traditional drivers must pay for cab medallions and pass numerous 
city tests and requirements;109 Lyft drivers, by contrast, need only strap a pink 
                                                                                                                     
 106 Alex Davies, New York’s Bike Share Is Brilliant, and Every Complaint About It Is 
Bogus, BUS. INSIDER (June 3, 2013), http://www.businessinsider.com/complaints-about-
citi-bike-share-are-wrong-2013-6 [http://perma.cc/CC7B-GEFC] (describing and responding 
to critiques of New York’s Citi Bike system). 
 107 See Monkey Parking App’s CEO Refuses to Halt Operations in SF, Despite Order 
from City Attorney’s Office, CBS S.F. (June 26, 2014), http://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/ 
2014/06/26/monkey-parking-apps-ceo-refuses-to-halt-operations-in-sf-despite-order-from-
city-attorneys-office/ [http://perma.cc/PB4T-CBPL] (describing MonkeyParking service, 
which allows people sitting in public parking spaces to sell the information that they are 
planning on leaving the space). 
 108 See Timothy B. Lee, Uber’s Vast Trove of Customer Data Is Ripe for Abuse, VOX 
(Nov. 18, 2014), http://www.vox.com/2014/11/18/7243093/uber-privacy-problems [http:// 
perma.cc/Q9DH-X6ML] (“And we know . . . that Uber can use customer data to draw 
conclusions about customers’ sex lives.”). 
 109 See Andrea Peterson, What it Looks Like When Taxi Drivers Protest Uber and Lyft 
in D.C., WASH. POST (Oct. 28, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 
the-switch/wp/2014/10/28/what-it-looks-like-when-taxi-drivers-protest-uber-and-lyft-in-d-c/ 
[https://perma.cc/HWV5-YDXR] (describing D.C. taxi cab drivers as being at a 
competitive disadvantage compared to Uber and Lyft drivers because of the complex 
licensing requirements and accompanying fees taxi drivers face).  
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novelty mustache to their car.110 Likewise, traditional hotels must pay taxes; 
Airbnb hosts, by contrast, often do not.111 
So far, this conflict over unfair competition has been resolved in several 
ways. Some cities strike deals with sharing firms, such as requiring tax 
payment in return for allowing operations.112 Others try to level the regulatory 
playing field, as when Colorado and Washington D.C. required that Uber 
conduct more extensive driver background checks and buy additional 
insurance, or as New Orleans proposed doing through a standardized 
limousine tax on both Uber and non-Uber cars.113 Others, however, take 
stricter tactics, either effectively or explicitly banning such sharing firms.114 
The sharing economy’s “de-professionalization” of goods and services 
also creates consumer protection concerns: rentals on Airbnb do not need to 
meet hotel fire standards,115 Lyft drivers do not need city certification or 
licensure,116 and community chefs on Kitchensurfing117 have no obligation to 
                                                                                                                     
 110 See Christine Lagorio-Chafkin, The Origin—and Evolution—of Lyft’s Pink 
Mustache, INC. (Aug. 1, 2014), http://www.inc.com/christine-lagorio/evolution-of-lyft-
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Uber’s Ridesharing Services, DENVER POST (June 5, 2014), http://www.denverpost.com/ 
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perma.cc/W6ZY-64CC]. 
 114 Lauren Frayer, Uber, Airbnb Under Attack in Spain as Old and New Economies 
Clash, NPR (July 29, 2014), http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2014/07/29/327796899/ 
uber-airbnb-under-attack-in-spain-as-old-and-new-economy-clash [http://perma.cc/BL23-
859U]; Alison Griswold, Seoul Is Taking a Hard Line on Uber. Will Other Cities Follow?, 
SLATE: MONEYBOX (July 22, 2014, 10:35 AM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/ 
2014/07/22/seoul_fights_uber_bans_the_service_and_plans_its_own_app.html [http://perma.cc/ 
67AJ-2ZKQ]; Brad Tuttle, 7 Cities Where the Sharing Economy Is Freshly Under Attack, 
MONEY (June 9, 2014), http://time.com/money/2800742/uber-lyft-airbnb-sharing-economy-
city-regulation/ [http://perma.cc/L97Y-H5FF]. 
 115 Baker, supra note 74.  
 116 See Bobby Kerlik, Rivals Try to Block Uber, Lyft in Pittsburgh, TRIBLIVE (Aug. 2, 
2014), http://triblive.com/news/allegheny/6543923-74/lyft-puc-ride#axzz3BDwh7wLz 
[http://perma.cc/N5UM-BN9A]. This fact has led many states to issue ominous—if 
vague—warnings. See also Ben Popken, States Warn of Rideshare Risks for Passengers, 
NBC NEWS (June 5, 2014), http://www.nbcnews.com/business/consumer/states-warn-
rideshare-risks-passengers-n116736 [http://perma.cc/4C9A-W8HN]. 
 117 See KITCHENSURFING, https://www.kitchensurfing.com [https://perma.cc/8QDB-
ZXWQ]. 
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follow local health regulations.118 Sharing economy proponents claim self-
regulation and market incentives sufficiently protect the public from these 
dangers.119 For example, online reviews help ensure “bad apples” are known 
to all.120 Also, successful sharing companies generally offer substantial 
backstop guarantees and insurance for users. Airbnb, for example, offers a one 
million dollar guarantee to both guests and hosts for property damage, a 
protection deployed “freakishly” fast in several high profile cases.121 
Yet notwithstanding such self-regulation, many cities remain 
understandably anxious about consumer protection issues. Several have 
banned sharing firms outright based on such issues,122 while others demand 
heightened consumer protections before sharing firms may operate.123 
Relatedly, there have also been consumer protection complaints about 
sharing-firm prices. Uber has (in)famously used “surge pricing” when demand 
is high, driving prices up in the name of attracting more drivers.124 While 
economists generally believe surge pricing is efficient, such measures are 
                                                                                                                     
 118 See Terms of Service Agreement, KITCHENSURFING, https://www.kitchen 
surfing.com/tos [http://perma.cc/8LDK-4FVQ] (last updated May 22, 2012). 
 119 See Jasmine Gardner, Your Most Valuable Digital Asset? It Might Just Be Your 
Integrity…, EVENING STANDARD (Mar. 18, 2014), http://www.standard.co.uk/lifestyle/ 
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 120 Of course, this itself could raise a host or privacy issues. Id. 
 121 Carr, supra note 99.  
 122 Mark J. Perry, Minneapolis and Seattle Restrict Ride-Sharing Services Lyft and 
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Term Rentals, OREGONLIVE (July 30, 2014), http://www.oregonlive.com/front-
porch/index.ssf/2014/07/portland_legalizes_airbnb-styl.html [http://perma.cc/8RT4-DKS7]. 
California imposes substantial consumer protection regulations on Uber and Lyft. Barbara 
Soderlin, How Are Ridesharing Services Like Lyft and Uber Regulated Across the U.S.?, 
OMAHA WORLD HERALD (July 6, 2014), http://www.omaha.com/money/how-are-
ridesharing-services-like-lyft-and-uber-regulated-across/article_f5a082eb-dfed-51e2-8f76-
a13222e181ed.html [http://perma.cc/6P5X-KEWJ] (“Drivers must have criminal 
background checks, and [Sharing Economy] companies are required to inspect vehicles, 
establish a driver training program, have a zero-tolerance policy on drugs and alcohol, and 
hold a commercial liability insurance policy that is in force while the driver is on the way 
to pick up a rider or is giving a ride.”). 
 124 Annie Lowrey, Is Uber’s Surge-Pricing an Example of HighTech Gouging?, N.Y. 
TIMES MAG. (Jan. 10, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/12/magazine/is-ubers-
surge-pricing-an-example-of-high-tech-gouging.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/M6EU-QVLT] 
(describing critiques of Uber’s surge pricing policy). 
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decidedly unpopular.125 Indeed, in response to public pressure, Uber has 
agreed to limit such surge pricing during emergencies and to donate surge 
profits to charities.126 
The “employment” side of the sharing market has also been criticized. 
Sellers of sharing services—Uber drivers and TaskRabbits—are not full-time 
employees and lack benefits like health insurance, training, or 401(k) 
donations.127 This has been the subject not only of political debate, but also 
lawsuits, with well-publicized litigation challenging whether workers in the 
sharing economy are properly classified as employees rather than independent 
contractors and thus deserving of greater protections and benefits.128 Wages 
can also be quite low.129 Thus, the rise of sharing firms as replacements for 
traditional, full-time jobs leads some to lament the rising “gig economy” as a 
wealth transfer from workers to capital, shifting risk from employers to 
workers.130 Sharing firms resist this claim, arguing their employees earn more 
than those in comparable “traditional” companies and that they are given 
supplementary income that would otherwise be unavailable.131 
                                                                                                                     
 125 See Ben Popper, Uber Surge Pricing: Sound Economic Theory, Bad Business 
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5. Who Has Problems with the Sharing Economy?  
Sharers v. Incumbents and “Neighbors” 
Each of these policy conflicts has a common political dimension: 
restrictive regulations on sharing firms are advocated by incumbent firms, 
workers for incumbent firms, and wary “neighbors” of sharing economy 
users.132 Conversely, these restrictions are opposed by sharing firms and their 
customers.133 Notably, these conflicts have played out largely in local and 
state politics.134 
At first blush, this conflict seems heavily tilted in the incumbents’ favor. 
Incumbent firms are intensely harmed by the rise of sharing services, as seen 
in the hotel135 and taxi industries.136 Yet the benefits of sharing services are 
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spread diffusely across many consumers and part-time employees. Therefore, 
the conflict between industry incumbents and sharing advocates at first seems 
a classic “Olsonian mismatch,” in which an intensely interested minority has 
the incentives to invest enough in politics to overcome the majority’s broad 
(but shallow) preferences.137 Relatedly, incumbent firms and homeowner 
groups are repeat players in local politics, with well-organized lobbying shops 
and long-term political relationships that new sharing entrants often lack. And 
indeed, by many conventional metrics of interest group competition, the 
incumbents seem far ahead. For instance, since 1990, the taxi industry has 
spent roughly 3,500 times as much on campaign donations as Uber, Sidecar, 
and Lyft combined.138 And even without considering their longer histories, 
incumbent firms have far larger political operations than sharing economy 
start-ups. In tech-friendly California, for instance, the taxi industry alone spent 
some $6.1 million on lobbying in a two-year span, compared with the entire 
sharing economy’s $384,000.139 
Yet despite this apparent imbalance, sharing firms have proven creative 
and effective in executing a now-familiar “playbook” to bend urban politics to 
their advantage. Step one is to open and develop customer bases before getting 
regulatory approval, creating “facts on the ground.”140 Next, once regulators 
begin to crack down, sharing firms claim they are not themselves service 
providers, but rather networks for connecting third-parties to one another.141 
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This forces cities onto the costly and politically dangerous terrain of enforcing 
against individual buyers and sellers.142 Finally, sharing firms leverage their 
huge base of loyal consumers to bombard politicians and regulators with 
emails and protests, compensating for a lack of entrenched organizing with 
tech and marketing savvy.143 The end result is that before cities can act, or 
incumbents can effectively counterpunch, sharing firms are simply “too big to 
ban.”144 
Apart from this “playbook,” high-profile sharing firms also have begun to 
develop sophisticated political arms.145 Uber hired David Plouffe, mastermind 
of Barack Obama’s presidential campaigns, to run its public affairs shop, 
while Lyft hired David Yassky, former head of New York City’s Taxi and 
Limousine Commission, as a consultant.146 Airbnb has hired political experts 
including the gurus behind New York Mayor Bill DeBlasio’s successful 
election campaign.147 And another Airbnb official helped form Peers, a 
grassroots organizing group aimed at promoting and protecting the sharing 
economy.148 Peers, in turn, has become a powerful political force under 
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director, and experienced politico, Natalie Foster (formerly of Obama for 
America, MoveOn.org, and the Sierra Club).149 
The result, for now, is that sharing firms have generally fought off 
incumbent challenges and won the right to provide most of their services in 
most places. Yet as several prominent examples illustrate, the twists and turns 
of this conflict are far from over. 
Uber: Today, Uber is the most valuable and prominent sharing firm.150 As 
noted, Uber allows riders to “e-hail” a variety of taxi options: limosuines 
(UberBlack), standard cabs (UberTaxi), SUVs (UberXL or UberSUV), rides 
with car seats for children (UberFamily), and amateur drivers (UberX or 
UberPop). Nor is it alone in the “sharing taxi” space: competitors Lyft and 
SideCar are both widely available, and BlaBlaCar a long-distance ride-sharing 
outfit, now has more European riders than the Eurostar train.151 
Despite (and because of) its popularity with consumers, Uber faces stiff 
pushback from incumbent taxi firms and regulators in almost every market it 
enters. To date, the anti-incumbent “playbook” has overcome many such 
attacks. In California, for example, Uber convinced state regulators to classify 
it as “transportation network company,” allowing it to operate in exchange for 
requiring driver background checks and increased insurance coverage.152 
Likewise, Washington D.C., Houston, and a number of other cities have 
passed ordinances explicitly permitting Uber to operate, imposing only limited 
rules about pricing, insurance, and taxes.153 Meanwhile, Uber has received 
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favorable audiences in state executive branches, with Governors like 
Virginia’s Terry McCaullife and Massachusetts’s Deval Patrick working to 
overturn state-regulatory bans on the service.154 
This is not to say Uber’s ascent has been entirely smooth. In some cities, 
particularly New York, regulators have forced it to change business models by 
requiring even (amateur) UberX drivers to be city-licensed drivers.155 
Pennsylvania’s Public Utility Commission has flirted with barring ride sharing 
entirely, though it allows Uber to operate on a conditional permit in most of 
the state.156 Maryland is considering similar regulations.157 More drastically, 
cities like Little Rock, Las Vegas, and Miami have made services like Uber 
effectively or actually illegal.158 
On another front, Uber has been sued by drivers claiming they have been 
misclassified as independent contractors and are thus entitled to 
reimbursement.159 Users and cities have also complained about Uber’s 
inappropriate gathering or use of rider data.160 Beyond the United States, Uber 
has faced substantial limitations, with UberPop (amateur) drivers being banned 
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from Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Spain.161 Uber’s CEO 
was even indicted in South Korea.162 
On the whole, however, Uber has been a resounding success; the network 
operates across most of America’s major metropolises, as well as smaller cities 
from Akron, Ohio to Tuscaloosa, Alabama.163 It has also branched out into a 
host of different services, from delivery to direct sales of consumer goods.164 
Most notably, the firm and its main competitor, Lyft, recently started bringing 
more actual sharing to the sharing economy by allowing riders to share taxis 
trips in a service some predict could eventually compete with jitneys or public 
buses.165 
Airbnb: Airbnb, along with firms like Couchsurfing,166 OneFineStay, and 
VRBO, allows owners (and lessors) of houses and apartments to rent out 
spaces from single rooms to full mansions on a short-term basis. In many 
ways, Airbnb’s regulatory problems are more serious than Uber’s.167 Houses 
used for such short-term rental may be in violation of zoning laws barring 
hotels from residential areas.168 Many cities and states also bar leases of less 
than thirty days unless the homeowner is also on premises.169 And even if the 
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host is present, short-term rentals frequently require formal bed and breakfast 
licenses.170 Meanwhile, existing tenant protection laws can, ironically, limit 
the ability of sharing-hosts to evict their “guests” once a stay is over, leading 
to incidents of “Airbnb squatters.”171 Sub-leasing through Airbnb can also 
violate the terms of lease agreements, giving landlords grounds to evict tenants 
(a tactic particularly used against those living in rent controlled units).172 
Short-term rentals can also run afoul of condo or co-op agreements, as well as 
homeowner association rules.173 And turning houses from primary residences 
into investment properties may violate the terms of most home mortgages.174 
Each of these issues is gleefully noted by the incumbent hotel industry and 
its political allies.175 For instance, Eric Schneiderman, New York’s Attorney 
General and a major recipient of hotel industry donations,176 has issued 
subpoenas for Airbnb’s records in order to crack down on individual housing 
violators.177 Likewise, a few Los Angeles County cities have begun targeting 
individual Airbnb hosts for failure to pay hotel taxes.178 
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To date, Airbnb’s primary rejoinder is that it is merely a platform, and so 
does not directly violate any housing laws.179 Indeed, it attempts to distance 
itself from violations by warning online users that they are (ostensibly) 
responsible for complying with all relevant local regulations.180 Yet the 
company has also responded through politics. In San Francisco and Portland, 
Airbnb successfully lobbied for regulations to legalize short term rentals 
(provided they comply with various tax and registration conditions).181 In New 
York, Airbnb has posted political advocacy ads on city subways and even 
sponsored the New York City Marathon.182 Elsewhere, sharing umbrella group 
Peers has organized national campaigns against crackdowns on home 
sharing.183 
Despite these legal and political challenges, Airbnb listings are now 
available in most American cities.184 Airbnb also continues to raise substantial 
funds from investors, suggesting a market unconvinced that legal or political 
problems will derail the company.185 This bet seems well founded, for 
notwithstanding the examples highlighted above, there is scant evidence that 
regulators have systematically cracked down on home-sharing services 
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 182 Alison Griswold, Airbnb to Sponsor NYC Marathon, SLATE: MONEYBOX (July 7, 
2014, 5:24 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/2014/07/07/airbnb_to_sponsor_ 
new_york_city_marathon_the_state_can_t_be_happy_about.html [http://perma.cc/3T64-SKTP].  
 183 See Leonard, supra note 140; Adrian Glick Kudler, Airbnb-Affiliated Lobbying 
Group Defeats Venice’s Attempts to Regulate Vacation Rentals in Los Angeles, CURBED 
L.A. (Nov. 25, 2013), http://la.curbed.com/archives/2013/11/airbnbaffiliated_lobbying_ 
group_defeats_venices_attempt_to_regulate_vacation_rentals_in_los_angeles.php [http:// 
perma.cc/X6BN-P2YU]. 
 184 Oddly, while taxi sharing economy firms have done much worse with European 
regulators than American ones, home-sharing firms have done better in Europe. Coldwell, 
supra note 167.  
 185 Ainsley O’Connell, Investors Say Lawbreakers Like Airbnb, Aereo, and Uber Are 
Increasingly Worth the Legal Bills, FAST COMPANY: CO.LABS (Apr. 1, 2014), 
http://www.fastcolabs.com/3028547/investors-say-lawbreakers-like-airbnb-aereo-and-uber-
are-increasingly-worth-the-legal-bills [http://perma.cc/35UP-YW2K]. 
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(perhaps because doing so would be quite unpopular).186 Airbnb thus appears 
to be a relatively permanent force in city life,187 leading The New York Times 
to report, as a fact in a news story, that “Airbnb is already too popular to 
dislodge completely, no matter what the housing laws say. It also delights 
travelers, who get a cheaper and usually more interesting place to stay.”188 
Uber, but for ___189: Beyond ride- and home-sharing platforms, other 
important conflicts loom. Food sharing, for example, is a fast-growing sharing 
economy niche. Operators include Kitchensurfing, a labor market for home 
chefs, and LeftoverSwap, which allows people to donate leftovers.190 The 
most frequent food-share model, however, matches diners with people willing 
to cook for them. These companies, such as EatWith,191 Feastly,192 and 
Kitchen.ly,193 allow people to operate de facto “home restaurants” where they 
charge “suggested donations” in return for meals.194 
Cities have begun investigating such services for tax and health code 
violations.195 The response by food-share firms—arguing they are merely 
                                                                                                                     
 186 David Hantman, New Quinnipiac Poll: New Yorkers Back Home Sharing, AIRBNB: 
PUB. POL’Y BLOG (Sept. 2, 2014), http://publicpolicy.airbnb.com/new-quinnipiac-poll-new-
yorkers-back-home-sharing [http://perma.cc/NU4Q-97GP]. 
 187 As seen in the recent inclusion of Airbnb into a trade group formerly dominated by 
more traditional travel companies. See Dennis Schaal, Changing of the Guard as Airbnb, 
TripAdvisor and HomeAway Join Travel Tech Trade Group, SKIFT (July 22, 2014), 
http://skift.com/2014/07/22/changing-of-the-guard-as-airbnb-tripadvisor-and-homeaway-
join-travel-tech-trade-group/ [http://perma.cc/5WLG-GTE3]. 
 188 David Streitfeld, Airbnb Listings Mostly Illegal, New York State Contends, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 15, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/16/business/airbnb-listings-mostly-
illegal-state-contends.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/SRZ4-32HQ]. 
 189 This construction has become a meme, with just about every new sharing company 
described as being like “Uber but for” some product. Aaron Sankin, Every Tech Startup Is 
Like Uber but for (Something), DAILY DOT (Aug. 7, 2014), http://www.dailydot.com/ 
technology/its-like-uber-but-for/ [http://perma.cc/K7WW-6RNR]. 
 190 As LeftoverSwap’s founder notes, “[i]t’s obviously not for everybody.” Elise Hu, A 
New App Will Let You Share Your Leftovers With Strangers, NPR (July 29, 2013), 
http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2013/07/29/206493794/a-new-app-will-let-
you-share-your-leftovers-with-strangers [http://perma.cc/DS24-42LG].  
 191 See EATWITH, http://www.eatwith.com [http://perma.cc/4YVP-2F2W]. 
 192 See FEASTLY, https://eatfeastly.com [https://perma.cc/A38Q-FAXX]. 
 193 See Kitchen.ly, GUST, https://gust.com/companies/kitchenly [https://perma.cc/ 
NX2E-SG4L] (providing an overview of Kitchen.ly and its startup “stage”).  
 194 See Ryan Lawler, Feastly Launches an “Airbnb for Dinner” Marketplace, 
TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 21, 2014), http://techcrunch.com/2014/04/21/feastly/ [http://perma.cc/ 
HAY2-SDES]; see also John Tozzi, It Turns Homes into Restaurants (and Tests Food 
Laws’ Boundaries), BLOOMBERG (July 26, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/ 
articles/2013-07-26/it-turns-homes-into-restaurants-and-tests-food-laws-boundaries [http:// 
perma.cc/8ZZL-2Z3H]. 
 195 Jim Epstein, Eating Out at a Home Restaurant: Should the Government Regulate 
Paid Dinner Parties?, REASON (May 13, 2014), http://reason.com/reasontv/2014/05/13/the-
rise-of-home-restaurants; see also Tozzi, supra note 194 (discussing food-sharing firms 
regulatory strategy).  
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“network services” and not, themselves, restaurants—takes a page straight 
from the Uber/Airbnb playbook.196 And if these services continue to build 
momentum, it seems clear the ensuing political fight will take a familiar form: 
incumbent restaurants will attempt to use influence with regulators and make 
arguments about use intensiveness, tax and regulatory fairness, or consumer 
protection, while sharing economy entrants will attempt to leverage their 
popularity to fight off regulations.197 
A second field to watch is municipal parking. American properties feature 
an enormous number of surplus parking spaces, a product both of consumer 
demand and of zoning regulations that set mandatory parking minimums at 
“peak demand” levels.198 Rentals of home parking spaces during special 
events like football games has long occurred in some cities.199 Yet in recent 
years, firms like ParkingPanda have started providing such services en masse 
through sharing economy tools (it’s like Airbnb, but for parking spaces).200 As 
the price of parking spaces in urban areas continues to increase (up to $1 
million parking spots in New York),201 demand for such services will likely 
surge. And if such services become more prominent, “traditional” patterns of 
sharing conflict will emerge. Private parking garages will claim PandaParkers 
                                                                                                                     
 196 See Tozzi, supra note 194 (observing that EatWith is “following the playbook of 
other ‘sharing’ businesses”). 
 197 Interestingly, a preview of this debate can be found in the various arguments for or 
against permitting the operation of “food trucks” in cities. For examples of how this 
conflict can play out, see M.D. Dupuy, Landrieu Dishes Food Truck Compromise, NOLA 
DEFENDER (June 21, 2013), http://www.noladefender.com/content/landri45eu-int2roduces-
food-truck-compromise [http://perma.cc/UGK9-YQKD]; Hilary Gowins, Three Cities 
Show How Food Trucks Live and Die on Political Whim, HUFFINGTON POST (SEPT. 25, 2014), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/hilary-gowins/three-cities-show-how-food-trucks_b_56216 
79.html [http://perma.cc/K5SJ-CP4Z] (last updated Sept. 25, 2014, 5:59 AM); Eleanor 
Mueller, Cities Struggle to Develop Fair Food-Truck Rules, USA TODAY (Dec. 11, 2014), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/12/11/food-truck-regulations/20215643 
[http://perma.cc/7P2M-MZ99]. 
 198 Donald C. Shoup, The Trouble with Minimum Parking Requirements, 33 TRANSP. 
RES. PART A 549, 552, 568 (1999), http://shoup.bol.ucla.edu/Trouble.pdf [http://perma.cc/ 
UH2T-HATP]. 
 199 Donald Shoup, Informal Parking Markets: Turning Problems into Solutions, in THE 
INFORMAL AMERICAN CITY 277, 278–79 (Vinit Mukhija & Anastasia Loukaitou-Sideris 
eds., 2014). 
 200 Christopher Seward, Parking Panda Offers to Ease Headaches with Online 
Reservations, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Aug. 29, 2014), http://www.ajc.com/news/business/ 
parking-panda-offers-to-ease-atlanta-parking-heada/nhB5P/ [http://perma.cc/T95V-RXTY]. 
These are distinct from parking apps like MonkeyParking, which allow current users of 
public parking spaces to sell the information that they are about to leave, which have been 
shut down in some cities. Laura Entis, San Francisco Says Enough Monkey Business: Tells 
Parking Spot App to Shut Down, ENTREPRENEUR (July 11, 2014), 
http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/235575 [http://perma.cc/2CG6-A5NN].  
 201 Michelle Higgins, Buy Condo, Then Add Parking Spot for $1 Million, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 9, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/10/realestate/million-dollar-parking-
spot.html [http://perma.cc/WJ4Y-U2DN]. 
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are not complying with consumer-protection regulations, while neighbors will 
protest new traffic and use intensiveness.202 
In sum, a pattern emerges from these conflicts203: incumbents, neighbors, 
and allied politicians have waged repeated campaigns against sharing firms. 
Sometimes there are solid public policy reasons behind these regulatory 
moves; often, there are not.204 Yet against this barrage, sharing firms have 
                                                                                                                     
 202 However, broad use may change the politics of parking. As Donald Shoup 
famously argued, homeowners regularly argue for and get cities to require new 
development to include excessive amounts of parking spaces, as they are worried that new 
entrants will take up scarce public parking spaces (a public good only because the city does 
not charge high enough prices). See generally DONALD SHOUP, THE HIGH COST OF FREE 
PARKING (2011). However, if people were renting out their own spaces, their interests 
would change, and they would have good reason to want to restrict new parking 
development. Matthew Yglesias, The End of Parking Misery, SLATE (Dec. 26, 2012), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/business/small_business/2012/12/parking_panda_rent_your_
unused_parking_space.html [http://perma.cc/8QTW-Q4XL]. 
 203 Another neat example: RelayRides and GetAround, which provide peer-to-peer car 
rental and provide insurance for accidents, have faced many problems with state insurance 
regulators because renting a car out can lead to cancellation of insurance or to car owner 
having liability notwithstanding service policies. See Herb Weisbaum, Car Sharing Hits 
Some Bumps in the Road, CNBC (June 5, 2013), http://www.cnbc.com/id/100789535 
[http://perma.cc/73RJ-FLGM]. But in California, Oregon, and Washington, car-sharing 
firms successfully lobbied for laws explicitly barring insurance companies from dropping 
coverage on the basis of their use as short-term rental as long as there is third-party (i.e., 
sharing company) insurance and the car is not being rented for profit. See Janelle Orsi, Car 
Sharing Laws for Everyone, SHAREABLE (Mar. 9, 2011), http://www.shareable.net/ 
blog/car-sharing-laws-for-everyone [http://perma.cc/HHM2-2VLX] (crediting car–sharing 
entrepreneur Sunil Paul for lobbying to get the law passed); Weisbaum, supra. Currently, 
RelayRides is available in 49 states (New York banned them on the basis of their insurance 
policy). See id. 
 204 Although the purpose of this article is not to argue the case for and against such 
services, we should put our cards on the table. Generally speaking, we think the case for 
using regulation to bar, or substantially curtail, the largest sharing services is not a very 
good idea, although the strength of such arguments differs between industries. For 
instance, the case against home-sharing firms seems more defensible than that against ride-
sharing services, although neither seems particularly compelling.  
The strongest plank in the case against home-sharing firms is premised on the 
reasonability of local zoning ordinances. If one thinks these laws are well-drawn, then 
allowing rentals that avoid them would be unadvisable. One of us has written, however, 
about how excessively restrictive many local zoning rules are, and how they destroy much 
valuable economic activity. See David Schleicher, City Unplanning, 122 YALE L.J. 1670 
(2013); see also Daniel B. Rodriguez & David Schleicher, The Location Market, 19 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 637 (2012). The regulatory limits on short-term rentals and zoning limits 
on the location of rentals are excessive; the reticence of regulators to crack down on them 
is wise. However, we can think of no public policy reason to limit contract-based remedies 
by landlords, co-ops, condos, or homeowner’s associations, and regulations that would 
make such claims easier may be attractive. See Richard A. Epstein, The War Against 
Airbnb, DEFINING IDEAS (Oct. 20, 2014), http://www.hoover.org/research/war-against-
airbnb [http://perma.cc/DQW9-DVDE] (describing how contract based remedies could 
solve many of the use conflicts inherent in the use of Airbnb). The case for substantially 
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shown unexpected political resilience, relying on popularity, financial 
resources, and political savvy.205 And as these firms grow, it is likely that they 
will become stronger still. 
Yet even if sharing firms do win these fights, the final result will not be a 
simple end to government regulation. Instead, it will be something 
considerably more complex. To see why, we must first examine the forces at 
the core of urban economics. 
III. TOMORROW’S SHARING ECONOMY UNDERSTOOD: THE CONTINUING 
BONDS BETWEEN SHARING FIRMS AND CITY GOVERNMENTS 
Discussions of the sharing economy suggest the end-state for such firms is 
to be barred either from participating in local markets or to be left wholly 
alone. In Part II, we showed why the former outcome is unlikely: for good or 
ill, the sharing firms seem here to stay. In this Part, however we show the latter 
outcome is equally unlikely: should sharing firms persist, cities will not ignore 
them. Instead, they will regulate them in a host of nuanced and complex ways. 
But to get there, we must first take a brief trip through urban economic theory. 
                                                                                                                     
regulating other similar types of sharing firms, particularly home restaurant sharing, strikes 
us as pretty compelling though.  
In contrast, it is hard to find even decent arguments in favor of limiting ride-sharing 
firms like Uber and Lyft. Taxi markets in many cities are swamps of rent-seeking, with 
incumbent holders of medallions realizing huge profits at the expense of consumers. See 
Katrina Miriam Wyman, Problematic Private Property: The Case of New York Taxicab 
Medallions, 30 YALE J. REG. 125, 136–38, 148–56 (2013). To the extent Uber et al. 
introduce competition into such fields—bringing down prices, increasing availability, and 
promoting an easier method of hailing taxis—it seems clear that consumer welfare will 
improve. See Badger, supra note 131 (finding surveyed economists universally agree that 
allowing entry by taxi sharing firms improves consumer welfare). Further, the evidence 
suggests ride-sharing services are equally or more available in poor areas than traditional 
taxis, and their drivers may also discriminate less on the basis of race. See infra notes 299–
300 and accompanying text. While some have raised concerns about ride-sharing firms 
engaging in unfair competition by charging below-cost prices, this is almost certainly a 
function of their role as platforms in two-sided markets—they are driving prices down in 
order to attract riders who will attract drivers. (Surge pricing represents the reversal of this 
pattern.) The firms do not appear to have any substantial market power yet, and while there 
are some economies of scale and network effects, two-sided markets do not, as a general 
matter, regularly result in monopolies. See Evans & Schmalensee, supra note 86, at 158. 
Further, there are few barriers to entry and many opportunities for product differentiation 
in the taxi field, making antitrust concerns at the very least far too soon. So, while there are 
many useful regulations of ride sharing in terms of privacy, consumer protection, 
insurance, and on other issues as well, there is little reason to categorically bar them from 
urban markets.  
 205 See, e.g., supra note 203. 
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A. On Agglomeration Economics 
The central question of urban economics is why cities exist, or more 
precisely, why anyone would choose to live in them. The question is harder 
than it seems: property and labor cost more inside cities, so for individuals or 
businesses to stay, there must be some special compensating benefit.206 
This benefit, it turns out, is density itself: the advantages that come from 
putting consumers and producers close to one another.207 Or, per Robert 
Lucas, “What can people be paying Manhattan or downtown Chicago rents 
for, if not for being near other people?”208 Specifically, when people and 
businesses are close together, they can realize several important forms of 
“agglomeration” benefits.209 It is this insight that forms the heart of modern 
urban economics. 
The first such benefit comes in shipping costs. Manufacturers that locate 
near suppliers (and vice versa) save money because their products need only 
travel across town (not cross-country).210 Mid-century auto-part suppliers had 
strong incentives to move to Detroit, which in turn made it an even more 
attractive site for car production.211 Over time, however, inventions like the 
combustion engine and the shipping container have substantially cut the cost 
of transporting goods, reducing the importance of this agglomerative 
dynamic.212 
Other forms of agglomeration benefit, however, stem not from the (now-
low) cost of shipping goods, but from the (still) high opportunity cost of 
                                                                                                                     
 206 “If we postulate only the usual list of economic forces, cities should fly apart. . . . A 
city is simply a collection of factors of production—capital, people and land—and land is 
always far cheaper outside cities than inside.” Robert E. Lucas, Jr., On the Mechanics of 
Economic Development, 22 J. MONETARY ECON. 3, 38–39 (1988). 
 207 “[T]o understand agglomeration economies is to go back to a fundamental 
definition of cities: the absence of physical space between people and firms. Cities are 
density, proximity, closeness.” See EDWARD L. GLAESER, CITIES, AGGLOMERATION, AND 
SPATIAL EQUILIBRIUM 6 (2008). 
 208 Lucas, supra note 206, at 39. 
 209 See ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 267–77 (8th ed. 1956); Edward 
L. Glaeser, Are Cities Dying?, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 139, 140 (1998); Schleicher, supra note 
13, at 1509–22.  
 210 Schleicher, supra note 13, at 1514 (reviewing literature).  
 211 Edward L. Glaeser & Janet E. Kohlhase, Cities, Regions and the Decline of 
Transport Costs, 83 PAPERS REGIONAL SCI. 197, 198 (2004). Some sharing firms—like 
Uber and Postmates—are or are moving into logistics, making inter-urban deliveries easier, 
but to date, this has more to do with consumer goods than with parts and supplies for 
production. But Transfix, “Uber for trucks,” may reduce shipping costs by better 
connecting trucks with routes, substantially cutting shipping costs at the regional level. See 
Eric Jaffe, How the Trucking Industry Could Be Vastly More Efficient, ATLANTIC: 
CITYLAB (Jan. 21, 2015), http://www.citylab.com/tech/2015/01/the-trucking-of-tomorrow-
is-here-and-its-a-huge-win-for-city-traffic/384672/ [http://perma.cc/YV6B-UCHB]. 
 212 See Virginia Postrel, The Container that Changed the World, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 
2006), www.nytimes.com/2006/03/23/business/23scene.html [http://perma.cc/7M3H-NAWJ]. 
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shipping people. People generally talk to and interact with people nearby (and 
don’t travel far to brainstorm), meaning that the denser an area is, the more 
new ideas people can pick up.213 A banker in suburban Ohio might interact 
with (and learn from) several dozen colleagues; the same banker in New York 
has access to thousands. The result, as Alfred Marshall famously noted, is that 
in dense cities, “[t]he mysteries of the trade become no mysteries; but are as it 
were in the air.”214 People in Silicon Valley learn about technology 
entrepreneurship by going to coffee shops; people on Capitol Hill learn about 
Congress by grabbing bad Mexican food with their friends.215 These 
“information spillovers” are reflected in the “urban wage premium”—the fact 
people in cities earn more than rural counterparts doing the same jobs.216 
Indeed, as Edward Glaeser and David Mare have shown, such spillovers lead 
to faster wage growth for urbanites, who become more productive through 
informal learning.217 
The final main form of urban agglomerative benefit is also the most 
relevant for our purposes: cities feature deep markets, with many buyers and 
many sellers. Market depth, in turn, offers many benefits.218 For workers, 
moving to a dense city brings opportunities to specialize, incentives to invest 
in human capital, easier “matching” with employers, and insurance against 
firm-specific risk. An actor who moves to L.A. can become a specialist in, say, 
playing zombies; the same actor in Duluth, Minnesota, would have to play any 
role available. The L.A. actor can thus invest in learning about zombies and 
how they have been portrayed, confident that the investment will be useful. 
Meanwhile, L.A.-based film studios can more easily match with actors good at 
playing zombies, whereas in Duluth, it would take considerable work to learn 
if anyone would be fit to play the undead. And an actor in L.A. can be 
confident that if her particular studio goes bust, other firms would be 
available; in a dense market, there are always other places to work. 
Notably, this labor-market dynamic is equally true of consumption and 
even non-pecuniary markets. “Restaurant rows” form because such groupings 
provide consumers with both “insurance” (against one place being full or a last 
minute change of preference) and the benefits of specialization.219 Diamond 
retailers in Manhattan largely crowd along one street for similar reasons.220 
                                                                                                                     
 213 To the extent that sharing economy firms encourage or allow new combinations of 
people in houses and offices, perhaps they encourage spillovers of this type. Schleicher, 
supra note 13, at 1536. 
 214 Marshall, supra note 209, at 271. 
 215 See Rodriguez & Schleicher, supra note 204, at 650–51. 
 216 Edward L. Glaeser & David C. Mare, Cities and Skills, 19 J. LAB. ECON. 316, 316–
19 (2001) (discussing causes of urban wage premium).  
 217 Id. at 322. 
 218 This example is drawn from Rodriguez & Schleicher, supra note 204, at 642, although 
that is far from the first time something similar has been used to illustrate this idea. 
 219 Id. at 643–44 (summarizing literature). 
 220 West 47th Street, between 5th and 6th Avenues. Id. at 643.  
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And many young people move to cities precisely for their deep “dating 
markets,” climates that allow for specialization in tastes, easier matching, and 
the insurance that there are always “more fish in the sea” after a breakup.221 
If moving to a city is so attractive, why doesn’t everyone do it? Because, 
as we noted, city life is expensive. More formally, even as it offers benefits, 
urban density also brings “congestion”—those costs related to packing many 
people close together.222 Congestion costs include higher rent per square foot, 
increased traffic and noise, and a deeper “market” for “negative 
agglomerations” like crime.223 Thus, even as agglomeration benefits explain 
why cities exist, congestion detriments explain why their expansion is 
ultimately limited. 
B. The Sharing Economy, Agglomeration, and Local Governmental 
Powers 
At a macro level, the “disaggregation economy” of sharing firms can 
provide cities with even more “agglomerative” benefits with even fewer 
“congestion” costs. 
The sharing economy improves the operation of agglomeration. Prior to 
the entry of sharing firms, it was surely possible to rent a room, to pay 
someone with a car for a ride, or to hire someone to dog sit. It was also far 
easier to do these things in dense urban areas than it is in rural areas, as there 
was greater market depth in hotels, drivers, and day-laborers. 
Yet, before the Internet, transaction costs rendered much of this dense 
market inaccessible. An ideal dog-sitter might have been a short subway ride 
away, but an interested dog owner would be unlikely to find her. A perfect 
chauffer might live across the street from an interested rider, but driver and 
passenger would have no way to find (or trust) each other. 
Sharing platforms remove such limits. By offering standardized pricing 
systems, web-hosted exchanges, searchable databases, reputational 
                                                                                                                     
 221 Id. Dating websites are generally not considered part of the sharing economy, but 
this is because they predate the development of the firms we ordinarily put in this group 
and because of hesitation about thinking of dating as a market. But services like OkCupid, 
eHarmony, and Tindr do the same thing as Uber: they serve as a platform permitting 
transactions/interactions between physically proximate parties. Indeed, some of the 
dynamics discussed in this Article have happened with dating sites, particularly state 
subsidies. The Fukui Prefectatuture in Japan funded its own dating website as part of an 
effort to boost population growth. See Aki Ito, Japan’s Government Plays Matchmaker, 
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 26, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/magazine/content/10_36/b41 
93012837623.htm [http://perma.cc/AH9C-K5K2]. Something similar has happened in 
South Korea, where local governments have taken over a federal program to promote 
“dating parties” to encourage match-making. Su-Hyun Lee, Mom Wants You Married? So 
Does the State, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/05/world/ 
asia/mom-wants-you-married-so-does-the-state.html [http://perma.cc/N5LZ-8HDS].  
 222 See Schleicher, supra note 13, at 1528–29. 
 223 Id. 
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information, and smart phone accessibility, services like Uber, Craigslist, and 
Airbnb connect a city’s myriad buyers with its myriad sellers. In doing so, 
they substantially deepen already deep urban markets. 
At the same time, sharing firms reduce congestion by permitting the 
borrowing and reuse of goods and reducing the need for costly space. People 
who rent power tools through Zilok have less need for closet space. People 
who use car2go or Uber may not need parking spaces at all. If under-used 
apartment units become de facto hotels, there is less need for stand-alone hotel 
construction.224 At the margin, these dynamics reduce urban congestion. 
Developing deeply agglomerative markets and reducing urban congestion 
are crucial to a city’s growth. Accordingly, city regulators have long had both 
the legal power and the political incentives to regulate industries that directly 
implicate the costs of congestion or involve trades between city residents. 
Local governmental powers are at their strongest when regulating property 
markets through zoning powers, regulating hotel and restaurant markets with 
tools like taxes and safety inspections, and regulating transportation through 
direct oversight and city-provided services.225 
Many sharing firms sell products and services squarely implicating such 
regulatory domains: taxi policy, food sales, land use, and others. Today, this 
dynamic leads to bitter conflict between entrenched incumbents and sharing-
firm upstarts. Yet if (as we predict) the sharing firms win out, cities will still 
retain a powerful interest in regulating and guiding these sectors, since they 
are crucial to the city’s agglomerative potential. Thus, the end result of the 
“sharing wars” is unlikely to be a libertarian paradise of minimal regulation. 
Instead, we will see complex webs of subsidies, taxes, regulatory 
redistributions, and reliance aimed at using sharing firms to achieve key 
governmental ends. 
In part, this involvement will be driven by the incentives of city 
policymakers. If we assume local governments are concerned with the public 
interest (even if imperfect at promoting it), we would expect cities to spend 
substantial effort in regulating industries at the heart of agglomerative 
prosperity. 
Another reason to expect intricate regulation stems from structure of local 
government powers. In general, American cities only have those limited 
powers granted to them by state governments or state constitutions.226 
However, in the fields where sharing firms participate—such as transit and 
housing—local government power is often at a zenith, and local regulatory 
                                                                                                                     
 224 Even unused office space can be, and has been, rented out as a hotel. Melissa 
O’Young, Turning Vacant New York Office Space into Midtown Hotels, COLLABORATIVE 
CONSUMPTION (June 28, 2013), http://www.collaborativeconsumption.com/2013/06/28/ 
turning-vacant-new-york-office-space-into-midtown-hotels/ [http://perma.cc/3ADT-VGG7]. 
 225 In contrast, local governments traditionally have little control over labor markets, 
which are usually regional in scope.  
 226 See generally GERALD E. FRUG & DAVID BARRON, CITY BOUND: HOW STATES 
STIFLE URBAN INNOVATION (2008). 
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bodies are already in existence (think taxi commissions and city health 
departments). Thus, given their structurally limited options, it would be 
unsurprising to see local governments using the powers they do have to 
achieve policy ends through sharing-economy regulation. 
To see how these dynamics play out in practice, we need only consider 
how cities already regulate incumbent industries in these sectors. Consider 
taxis. In New York, taxis must buy medallions before picking up riders, a 
source of city revenue.227 In turn, cabbies are largely protected against 
competition, since the city never sells enough medallions to ensure a fully 
competitive market. Taxi rates are also closely controlled by the Taxi and 
Limousine Commission (TLC).228 Acceptable vehicles and vehicle conditions, 
accessibility for the disabled, and payment methods are all regulated and 
standardized,229 as is the behavior of taxi drivers,230 and the TLC has the 
power to levy fines for violations like overcharging.231 Meanwhile “yellow 
cabs” are also officially promoted as authentically “New York” experiences 
for tourists.232 Nor are taxis unique: one can tell similar stories about the 
extensive, complicated relationships between city regulators and hotels, 
housing developers, labor providers, and restaurants. 
History’s lesson is clear. When it comes to industries at the heart of urban 
connectivity—transit, housing, consumer retail, and others—cities have both 
the power and incentives to be deeply and thoroughly involved. The next Part 
will discuss how cities will engage with sharing economy firms. 
IV. TOMORROW’S “SHARING” REGULATION: THREE PREDICTIONS 
Up to now, the relationship between sharing firms and city governments 
has been marked by adversarial conflict. Yet, as sharing firms establish 
themselves, this relationship will instead come to resemble the mishmash of 
policies that cities use to regulate incumbents like taxis, property developers, 
government contractors, restaurants, hotels, or parking garages. Just as these 
 
                                                                                                                     
 227 Wyman, supra note 204, at 125 (explaining how medallions function). 
 228 N.Y.C TAXI & LIMOUSINE COMM’N RULES § 52-04(b)(1) (2014), http://www.nyc.gov/ 
html/tlc/downloads/pdf/rule_book_current_chapter_52.pdf [http://perma.cc/YUP9-9QRT]. 
 229 See id. § 58-29 to -41 (2015), http://www.nyc.gov/html/tlc/downloads/pdf/rule_ 
book_current_chapter_58.pdf [http://perma.cc/QFY7-KK3G]. 
 230 Medallion Taxicab Passenger Bill of Rights, N.Y.C. TAXI & LIMOUSINE COMM’N, 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/tlc/html/passenger/taxicab_rights.shtml [http://perma.cc/M69S-
HR58]. 
 231 See N.Y.C. TAXI & LIMOUSINE COMM’N RULES, supra note 228, § 54-02(e) see also id. 
at ch. 68, http://www.nyc.gov/html/tlc/downloads/pdf/rule_book_current_chapter_68.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/ALU5-9VFS]. 
 232 Phil Patton, The Taxi as Icon, TAXI TOMORROW, http://www.nyc.gov/ 
html/media/totweb/taxioftomorrow_taxiasicon.html [http://perma.cc/YE9L-F5TS] (“The 
taxicab is a symbol of New York to millions of tourists.”). 
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entities both benefit from local government largesse and are required to 
provide a mix of services and payments to the city, so too will sharing firms. 
This Part sets out three predictions about where the local regulation of 
sharing economy is heading. Our analysis stems largely from the 
characteristics these firms share with current objects of local regulation. We do 
not suggest these policies will emerge everywhere and all at once, or that they 
will wholly supplant today’s conflicts over consumer protection, tax fairness, 
or use intensiveness. Yet, on the whole, tomorrow’s sharing economy will be 
regulated very differently from today’s. 
A. Like Uber, but for Government Largess: Subsidizing the Sharing 
Economy Like a Sports Stadium 
Today, cities often seek to curb sharing-firm operations. In coming years, 
however, we predict an almost opposite phenomenon: increasingly, cities will 
actively subsidize sharing-firm operations.233 
To see why, we must compare sharing firms to another high-profile urban 
industry: sports franchises. Historically, city governments have offered sports 
teams extensive subsidies—particularly in the form of stadium construction—
in exchange for their locating in the city.234 Few policies divide economists 
from laypeople as starkly as these subsidies. Economists often see publicly 
funded stadiums as wasteful albatrosses, arguing that generous loans, 
sweetheart financing and upfront payments mean stadiums usually leave cities 
poorer than they started.235 Promised job growth, meanwhile, rarely 
materializes.236 
Why, then, do cities subsidize stadiums? Some say the answer is more 
emotion than logic: stadiums are beloved symbols, winning consistent support 
                                                                                                                     
 233 Here, we are talking about local and state subsidies, not federal policies that have 
the effect of making freelancing generally easier. See Evan McMorris-Santoro & Johana 
Bhuiyan, How Obamacare Drives the Sharing Economy, BUZZFEED (Oct. 14, 2014), 
http://www.buzzfeed.com/evanmcsan/how-obamacare-drives-the-sharing-economy [http:// 
perma.cc/X2P2-4X5X] (quoting venture capitalist Marc Andreessen as arguing that the 
Affordable Care Act is “perhaps the single biggest key enabler for the sharing/gig/1099 
economy”). 
 234 See, e.g., Richard Florida, The Never-Ending Stadium Boondoggle, ATLANTIC: 
CITYLAB (Sept. 10, 2015), http://www.citylab.com/politics/2015/09/the-never-ending-
stadium-boondoggle/403666 [http://perma.cc/DL3S-AYWY]. 
 235 See Roger G. Noll & Andrew Zimbalist, The Economic Impact of Sports Teams and 
Facilities, in SPORTS, JOBS, AND TAXES 55, 88–89 (Roger G. Noll & Andrew Zimbalist 
eds., 1997) [hereinafter Economic Impact]. 
 236 Robert A. Baade & Allen R. Sanderson, The Employment Effect of Teams and 
Sports Facilities, in SPORTS, JOBS, AND TAXES, supra note 235, at 92, 112 (“[T]he results 
of this study do not support a positive correlation between professional sports and job 
creation.”); Mark S. Rosentraub, Stadiums and Urban Space, in SPORTS, JOBS, AND TAXES, 
supra, at 178, 205. 
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from both politicians and voters whatever the cost.237 Indeed, sports teams 
often get such favorable terms only because citizens so adamantly support 
them. 
But such subsidies might be explained—and at least partly justified—by 
three economic dynamics: (1) the creation of “uncaptured” consumer surplus, 
(2) the desire to be seen as a “world class city,” and (3) their potential to 
overcome entrenched political opposition to allow other infrastructure 
investments to be made.238 In varying forms, these forces are also at work in 
the sharing economy. Moreover, sharing subsidies offer a fourth benefit that 
stadiums do not: reducing congestion. Thus, for at least some sharing sectors, 
stadium-style subsidies will likely emerge. 
1. Public Goods and Consumer Surplus 
Perhaps the most prominent argument for stadium subsidies is that, as 
economist Allen Sanderson notes, they make people happy in ways that teams 
or cities cannot capture as economic gain.239 Conventional metrics like job 
creation or tax revenue cannot account for the “joy” and “civic pride” that 
local teams give citizens.240 Anecdotally, this phenomenon is well 
supported,241 while empirically, there is evidence that major sports events do 
offer broad, non-captured benefits to the public; when countries host the 
World Cup or Olympics, for example, self-reported resident happiness rises 
significantly.242 Such joy, in turn, is a classic public good.243 Civic and team 
pride are neither excludable nor rivalrous: the Kansas City Royals cannot stop 
(or cannot stop at reasonable cost) Kansas City residents from being happy 
about their victories or from following the team in mass media. Nor does one 
fan’s joy take away from another’s. Further, since many fans are obsessive 
(“fan” being derived from “fanatic”), they may value tickets and other chances 
                                                                                                                     
 237 See Roger G. Noll & Andrew Zimbalist, Sports, Jobs, and Taxes: The Real 
Connection, in SPORTS, JOBS, AND TAXES, supra note 235, at 494, 507 (“Professional sports 
in the United States are subsidized because they are very popular monopolies.”). 
 238 We are not going to discuss dynamics that are not shared with sharing economy 
firms. For instance, sports team subsidies are sometimes caused by the “unit problem” or 
the fact that you cannot have fifty percent of a sports team. Sharing services, by contrast, 
can be provided in granular ways.  
 239 See Allen R. Sanderson, In Defense of New Sports Stadiums, Ballparks and Arenas, 
10 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 173, 176 (2000).  
 240 Id. 
 241 E.g., Ramon Antonio Vargas, New Orleans Saints Super Bowl Parade Crowd Was 
Largest in Memory, Organizer Says, TIMES-PICAYUNE (NEW ORLEANS) (Feb. 10, 2010), 
http://www.nola.com/superbowl/index.ssf/2010/02/new_orleans_saints_super_bowl_9.html 
[http://perma.cc/95P7-ZK58]. 
 242 Georgios Kavetsos & Stefan Syzmanski, National Well-Being and International 
Sports Events, 31 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 158, 159 (2010). 
 243 See Sanderson, supra note 239, at 190. 
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to watch their team far more than the marginal price of doing so.244 Thus, at 
the level of individual cities, subsidizing a stadium can create considerable 
consumer surplus, justifying otherwise irrational spending.245 
Where sharing firms are successful, they too create public goods and 
substantial consumer and producer surplus for residents. As noted in 
Part II.B.3, this tendency stems from the “two-sided” markets many sharing 
firms create.246 First, platforms generate the public good of valuable price 
information. For example, the existence of Airbnb allows renters—whether 
they use the service or not—to know how valuable their apartments are. Peer-
to-peer sharing networks also create markets for goods many people already 
have on hand or own for other purposes (i.e., spare power tools, idle cars, etc.). 
Once a sharing firm begins operations, there will be many sellers for whom the 
market creates pure producer surplus—profit where none was previously 
possible. Moreover, on the “buy” side, many goods offered by the sharing 
economy do not have easy substitutes (e.g., before “Rent the Runway,”247 the 
selection of high-end clothes rentable for exactly one day was quite limited). 
Thus, just as the markets created by eBay and Craigslist generated substantial 
wealth from people’s existing possessions, so too do sharing services offer 
vast consumer and producer surplus.248 
So, as in the case of stadiums, sharing firms can make a city richer and 
happier, but in ways sharing firms themselves cannot capture. And as in the 
stadium context, this may provide a key justification for subsidies. 
A final, related similarity turns not on economics but on politics. Because 
they create mass producer and consumer surplus, sharing firms can generate 
the same sorts of mass popular support that often accompany pushes for 
stadiums. Indeed, while sharing firms do not have sports teams’ ability to 
threaten exit to extract gains, they do have the capacity to rally “fans” for 
political gain. 
2. Sharing Firms and the “World Class” City 
A second common justification for stadium subsidies is that stadiums “put 
a city on the map.”249 On this account, cities subsidize sports teams in hopes 
of being seen as “world class”—or at least nationally prominent. Being “on the 
map” might offer two types of benefits. First, being “world class” might 
                                                                                                                     
 244 Id. at 191. 
 245 And theoretically, if cities only bid up to the amount of their added value, it might 
lead to an efficient market. Economic Impact, supra note 235, at 86. 
 246 See Mahoney, supra note 88, at 1475.  
 247 See Marx, supra note 95. 
 248 See Ravi Bapna et al., Consumer Surplus in Online Auctions, 19 INFO. SYS. RES. 
400, 400 (2008) (finding that “eBay’s auctions generated $7.05 billion in total consumer 
surplus in 2003”). 
 249 See John Siegfried & Andrew Zimbalist, The Economics of Sports Facilities and 
Their Communities, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 95, 109 (2000). 
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directly raise a city’s profile for industries like tourism (though empirical 
support for this proposition is uncertain).250 Second, being “on the map” might 
make cities more attractive or exciting places to live, drawing in new residents 
and keeping existing ones from needing to leave for a “real city.” This concern 
is particularly salient as applied to mobile and well-educated workers.251 As 
Richard Florida has famously argued, a city’s prosperity is increasingly tied to 
its ability to attract well-educated and highly skilled human capital, suggesting 
cultural amenities can be economically essential.252 To be sure, not everyone 
agrees that “on-the-mapness” is an essential investment for cities, or that 
stadiums achieve this goal.253 Yet even critics concede that, whatever its 
empirical soundness, this argument carries considerable influence with city 
policymakers.254 
Increasingly, sharing firms are crucial markers of “on-the-mapness.” The 
American Planning Association found sixty-seven percent of urban residents 
and seventy-three percent of the young “millennial generation” saw access to 
sharing services as at least somewhat important to them.255 Echoing this, 
Pittsburgh’s mayor opposed new regulations on ride sharing by stating: “I will 
not let Pittsburgh’s emerging status as a 21st-century technological hub be 
sacrificed by unaccountable bureaucrats clinging to the past.”256 
On this account, the presence of bike- or car- or home-sharing services 
conveys something important about how progressive,257 how technologically 
advanced,258 and indeed how “world class” a city is.259 In the same way an 
                                                                                                                     
 250 Economic Impact, supra note 235, at 69–70; Siegfried & Zimbalist, supra note 249. 
 251 Though this, too, has been challenged empirically. See DENNIS ZIMMERMAN, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., CRS-1996-ECN-0240, TAX-EXEMPT BONDS AND THE ECONOMICS OF 
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 256 Kim Lyons, Mayor Bill Peduto Promises Ride-Share “Fight” in Pittsburgh, 
GOVTECH (July 3, 2014), http://www.govtech.com/local/Peduto-promises-ride-share-fight-
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 257 Ben Fried, Sadik-Khan Announces a Bike-Share Program That’s Big Enough to 
Succeed, STREETSBLOG (Sept. 14, 2011), http://www.streetsblog.org/2011/09/14/sadik-
khan-announces-a-bike-share-program-thats-big-enough-to-succeed [http://perma.cc/UL4X-
X4N8] (describing a left-wing Working Families Party leader arguing that bike sharing 
was obviously progressive). 
 258 See Gabriel Metcalf & Jennifer Warburg, A Policy Agenda for the Sharing 
Economy, SPUR (Oct. 9, 2012), http://www.spur.org/publications/article/2012-10-09/policy-
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NFL team signaled to previous generations that mid-sized cities were “real 
places,” Uber availability might signal to their grandchildren that such cities 
are vibrant hubs worth moving to (or at least not fleeing from). This, too, may 
justify subsidies. 
Further, it could provide political allies for sharing economy firms: in the 
stadium subsidy context, for example, big business often provides key support 
by arguing that a sports stadium today helps recruit talent tomorrow.260 To the 
extent sharing firms make it easier to recruit talented workers, business elites 
may likewise lobby to subsidize such services.261 
3. Sharing Firms as a Regulatory “Hack” 
A final justification for stadium subsidies is the need to “bypass” 
entrenched political interests. Under ordinary political conditions, necessary 
reforms and changes can be bogged down by gridlock, regulatory capture, or 
destructive “NIMBY-ism.” Neighborhoods can remain blighted or transit hubs 
unbuilt because of disagreement over who will bear the immediate costs of 
solving the problem. 
Big projects like new stadiums, however, can override such political 
sclerosis.262 By requiring tight deadlines and generating substantial public 
will, such projects force local interests to “get in line” or risk the wrath of 
constituents. Sports projects can also coordinate planning across otherwise 
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 261 See Aaron Mesh, Drive: Portland Tried to Run from Uber. Then the Mayor 
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unconnected agencies and offices, overcoming traditional intra-agency 
“stovepipes.”263 Such projects may also mean the arrival of subsidies from 
other levels of government or from private sources, largess that offers latitude 
to “buy off” otherwise recalcitrant interests with “side payments.” In sum, 
stadium projects can galvanize political momentum in ways that can quickly 
and profoundly reshape a city. Thus, even if stadium subsidies do not make 
economic sense, they may carry crucial political benefits. 
Like stadiums, sharing firms offer a sort of political bypass. Frequently, 
incumbent firms capture city regulatory bodies like taxi and limousine 
commissions or tourism boards.264 Moreover, ordinary Olsonian dynamics 
mean that established incumbents, from hotel employee unions to 
neighborhood advisory boards, have substantial influence over local 
policymaking.265 And because city councils rarely face much majoritarian 
pressure—voters know little about them or their stances, and majority party 
candidates and incumbents rarely lose—they are particularly subject to capture 
by powerful interests or co-option by NIMBY neighborhood groups. Thus, in 
normal times, citywide officials who want to pursue broad goals like 
increasing tourism, increasing property tax receipts, or redefining mass transit 
face a host of local “veto points.” 
But if the current “sharing wars” show anything, it is that sharing firms, 
once established, “bypass” many traditional political obstacles. Powerful 
incumbent firms, pugnacious labor unions, and influential homeowner groups 
have met their match when facing the widespread consumer demand for 
sharing services.266 The upshot is that once sharing firms come to town, 
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incumbent industries and entrenched interests can be more readily dislodged, 
and broader reforms become possible.267 Thus, even if sharing economy 
subsidies did not make economic sense, they may still be important tools to 
achieve city wide change. Citywide officials may view the cost of subsidies as 
not worth it on its own, but in a second-best world, benefits provided to 
sharing firms might help provide political support for removing policies that 
are worse.268 
4. Sharing Firms as Decongestant 
Finally, subsidies to sharing firms offer a key benefit that stadium 
subsidies do not: reducing urban “congestion.” As noted in Part III.A, 
“congestion” refers to those negative effects of urban density, particularly high 
rents, that cap a city’s growth potential. Sharing firms, however, have the 
positive externality of reducing such congestion, since they allow property to 
be used more efficiently. Further, they also may allow cities to avoid costly 
policies that are designed to reduce congestion. 
As an example, consider parking minimums—the number of parking 
spaces cities require new stores, offices or apartments to provide. Today, such 
minimums are often set at levels aimed at ensuring that no shopper, new office 
worker, or new resident at any time, displaces public parking.269 To meet this 
bar, stores must generally provide enough parking to accommodate peak 
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traffic.270 Likewise, bowling alleys are required to provide five spaces per 
alley plus one for each employee, so they can accommodate all bowlers and 
employees if an alley is full.271 Unsurprisingly, this results in vastly excessive 
parking spaces, increasing the costs of construction, housing, office space, and 
retail goods. If sharing firms like ParkingPanda make spaces more readily 
available for rent, or if firms like Uber and Lyft reduce the number of shoppers 
who need to park at all, such inefficient parking maxima can be greatly 
reduced.272 
Similarly, services like Airbnb can save cities space and money that might 
otherwise be needed for hotels and lodging. In turn, it can also enable cities to 
host larger events than previously possible by providing “surge capacity” for 
times of peak demand. Brazil failed to build sufficient hotel rooms for the 
World Cup in 2014, but Airbnb and other house rental firms were able to 
shelter twenty percent of visiting fans, averting a potential crisis.273 Similar 
dynamics have been seen in business travel, where sharing firms permit larger 
conventions and gatherings than otherwise possible.274 
In sum, reducing congestion is an externality that sharing firms offer 
cities, one that might justify subsidies even if it does not immediately appear 
on local balance sheets. 
a. How Will Subsidies Work? 
While the principles behind stadium subsidies and sharing-firm subsidies 
are similar, the forms they take will differ. In the case of stadiums, common 
subsidies include infrastructure improvements, discounted land, and tax-
exempt financing.275 
Sharing firms, by contrast, will sometimes be subsidized by direct 
ownership: cities operating proprietary sharing services of their own. This is 
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Events, ATLANTIC: CITYLAB (Sept. 29, 2014), http://www.citylab.com/tech/2014/09/ 
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 274 See Matt Krupnic, Businesses Turn to Airbnb, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/07/business/businesses-turn-to-airbnb-for-corporate-
travel.html [http://perma.cc/XY92-XGTP].  
 275 Economic Impact, supra note 235, at 65. 
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the model seen in urban bike-shares, where cities buy and own a public fleet or 
hire firms to do so on their behalf.276 Yet while bike-shares are the best-known 
“city owned” sharing, they are not alone. Several cities own car fleets that, 
through state and federal subsidies, are rented out at subsidized rates via public 
car-share programs.277 Meanwhile, cities from Seoul to Washington D.C. have 
tried to develop Uber-type apps for their municipal taxi fleets.278 
Elsewhere, cities might simply use direct payments. Already, some 
sharing firms receive cash subsidies in exchange for expanding service: 
Getaround,279 for example, received a federal grant in return for expanding car 
sharing in Portland, Oregon.280 Other cities subsidize the sharing economy 
through with tax breaks. Multnomah County, Portland, Boston, and Chicago 
have all imposed lower taxes on car-sharing firms than on ordinary car rental 
services.281 
Cities also might subsidize sharing firms through free or reduced-cost city 
services. Cities like Denver and San Francisco, for instance, offer free street 
parking to car-share users.282 In the future, such cities might go further, 
requiring buildings to designate parking spaces for shared cars, or conditioning 
the approval of new apartments on a developer’s paying for residents’ car-
share memberships.283 
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Finally, cities may offer de facto “subsidies” in the form of regulatory 
laxity, allowing sharing upstarts to avoid costly compliance with regulations. 
Today, this state of affairs is less a matter of intentional policy and more a 
matter of outmoded regulation. Yet as cities codify their approach to sharing 
firms, the rigor of enforcement could serve as a powerful way to “tilt the 
playing field” toward being sharing friendly.284 
b. Where Will Subsidization Happen? 
The final question is where subsidization behavior should be expected. 
Based on the dynamics we outline, several types of cities are especially likely 
to embrace subsidization. These include: 
Cities Seeking “Bigness”: Sharing firms, like sports stadiums, will 
“organically” arrive in America’s biggest cities. Places like New York, 
Chicago, and Los Angeles will almost always have full panoply of sharers. For 
smaller cities, however, the dynamic is different. Car-sharing firms that rely on 
economies of scale might think twice before jumping into Colorado Springs, 
Colorado or Mobile, Alabama.285 Lyft strategists looking to expand to a new 
city may find Ann Arbor, Michigan and State College, Pennsylvania to be 
equally attractive, but only have the resources to operate in one.286 
Likewise, smaller cities may see the entry of one sharing firm, but not its 
competitors, creating concerns about market power. These cities might 
consider providing subsidies in order to promote competition among sharing 
firms. For these smaller cities, the availability of sharing subsidies might be 
particularly important and worthwhile. 
Sites of Political Conflict: Subsidies may also be embraced by cities where 
political gridlock is especially formidable. Where entrenched interest groups 
wield great sway, citywide officials might propose sharing subsidies to make an 
“end-run” around opponents’ influence. That is, where citywide officials 
confront powerful opposition in industries like transportation, tourism, or retail 
goods, direct or implicit sharing subsidies may well proliferate. Notably, other 
fields, like education, have seen similar dynamics, as when mayors in Newark, 
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New Jersey or New York City have pushed charter schools as a way to 
circumvent the influence of teachers’ unions.287 
“Sharing Mad” Cities: Finally, some places, like San Francisco or 
Portland, may have populations that derive especially high civic pride from a 
robust sharing scene.288 In such cities, being at the cutting edge of technology 
or being environmentally sustainable is important to a very high number of 
citizens, suggesting sharing subsidies would enjoy broader support. A useful 
comparison might be to “sports mad” cities, places where no elected official 
could conceive of losing the home team, and where said team thus has great 
leverage to extract concessions.289 
    
Of course, wherever sharing subsidies are offered, they will raise 
important normative, legal, and policy questions. The experience of stadiums 
shows such expenditures are far from “sure winners,” and even if they make 
economic sense, they might still run afoul of “public purpose” requirements 
that limit city subsidies to private corporations.290 Nevertheless, as a 
descriptive matter, such subsidies will likely increase in prominence in coming 
years, bringing such questions to the fore. 
B. Like Uber, but for Services for the Urban Poor: The Sharing 
Economy as Instrument of Economic Redistribution 
In theory, sharing firms can offer important benefits to lower income 
residents, like access to otherwise unaffordable goods or to new work 
opportunities. To date, however, this potential is largely unrealized: sharing 
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firms have concentrated both their marketing and their operations on upscale 
consumers. 
Enter local governments: cities often seek to redistribute resources to 
poorer residents and neighborhoods by using tools other than taxes and direct 
spending. Sharing firms offer a potential vehicle for doing so. Therefore, in the 
near future, we expect cities will harness sharing firms as instruments of 
redistribution, such as by making sharing operations conditional on providing 
redistributive services. These services, in turn, could include expanded 
operations in poorer areas, mandated discounts in such areas, or hiring 
advantages for workers from disadvantaged backgrounds. If cities take this 
path, they will echo a long tradition of requiring antipoverty “exactions” from 
firms seeking market access, such as urban property developers. Importantly, 
this form of regulation may actually be welcomed by the regulated, for it 
might allow sharing firms to tout their redistributive function and, in doing so, 
broaden their support. 
Sharing firms have the potential to be especially beneficial for the urban 
poor. On a direct level, they allow rental access to goods that might otherwise 
be unobtainable. There is nothing new about people choosing to rent when 
money is tight. Yet “analog” rental operations catering to low-income areas 
have a troubled history of customer exploitation, suggesting new peer-to-peer 
entrants could create broader and fairer opportunities.291 At the same time, 
sharing firms could also allow low-income sellers to mitigate the cost of 
capital expenditures. Rents can be partially offset by letting rooms on Airbnb, 
car costs can be offset by renting on RelayRides, and so on. Finally, sharing 
firms like TaskRabbit, Wonolo, UberX, and Lyft could provide opportunities 
for second and third jobs for un- and under-employed city residents. 
These benefits for the less well-off are not speculative; a key reason 
sharing services are already popular with young adults is that they offer 
particular benefit to the (relatively) cash-poor, the capital constrained, and the 
jobless.292 
However, with few exceptions, most sharing firms do not do much 
business in poor communities.293 Instead, they are criticized for preaching a 
communitarian “collaborative consumption” while in practice mostly serving 
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urban yuppies.294 Why is this so? One possibility is poorer communities 
already feature extensive non-commercial borrowing, reducing opportunities 
for sharing-firm entrants. Poor neighborhoods often feature elaborate informal 
ecosystems of “insurance” and sharing—tacit agreements to provide services 
like day care, opportunities to borrow goods like cars, and unofficial 
employment networks.295 Thus, perhaps such informal networks outperform 
and displace any sharing economy benefits. 
Yet even if such informal arrangements offer some sharing-firm benefits, 
they are not perfect substitutes. When share or rental markets are limited to 
one neighborhood, this naturally limits the types and quality of goods 
available. Moreover, notwithstanding this informal ecosystem, for-profit 
“analog” rental stores have long flourished in low-income areas, suggesting 
informal sharing leaves many needs unmet.296 And “gigs” undertaken through 
Taskrabbit or Uber would allow un- and under-employed residents to more 
readily transition to employment beyond the local informal market. So, the 
existence of informal sharing cannot explain why sharing firms have yet to 
arrive in many poor areas. 
A second possibility is that the design of sharing platforms—which 
generally require Internet access and credit cards—may deter low-income 
residents who have neither. Today, however, access to the Internet, 
smartphones and pre-paid payment cards is fairly widespread even among the 
urban poor, certainly providing enough potential consumers if firms wanted to 
serve them.297 And the fact that sharing services are structured to require smart 
phones and/or credit cards is likely as much a function of a decision not to try 
to reach poorer consumers as it is a technological hurdle. 
A third possibility is that the use of online “reputation” in sharing 
platforms has disadvantaged poor communities. As noted, many sharing firms 
rely on participant ratings to establish credibility. This feature can have 
important consumer protection benefits. But perhaps these systems are also 
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vulnerable to racial or socioeconomic biases, leading marginalized 
communities to “underperform” on sharing platforms.298 
This explanation, however, is also suspect. Reputation scores should allow 
even biased users to rely on actual performance rather than stereotypes or 
assumptions.299 For instance, Uber has been promoted as a solution to the 
problem of racist discrimination by cab drivers, as it allows drivers to make 
performance-based judgments about particular passengers rather than relying 
on often-bigoted stereotypes.300 
A final possibility is that sharing firms focus less on poor consumers 
simply because such firms are relatively new. It is not surprising that emerging 
companies would focus on richer consumers first, creating limousine services 
before bus jitneys, or promoting villa rentals before housing in poor areas. On 
this telling, sharing firms target yuppies for the same reason Willie Sutton 
robbed banks: that’s where the money is.301 Indeed, even government-
provided “sharing” usually starts in rich areas: city-supported bike-shares are 
usually rolled out in rich areas and tourist venues, and only expand to poorer 
neighborhoods later (if at all).302 On this count, sharing firms might someday 
build a customer base in poorer areas, but for now the available margins may 
be too small to justify expansion. 
Whatever the reason, this state of affairs provides a window for 
redistribution-minded city governments. On one hand, the urban poor could 
benefit greatly from more access to sharing firms. At the same time, sharing 
firms depend on local approval to operate freely. This presents a natural 
“trade”: redistribution-minded cities may expressly or implicitly require 
sharing firms to serve poor residents in exchange for regulatory approval. 
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Notably, such measures avoid the limits on tax-and-revenue raising that state 
law imposes on many municipalities. 
In comparable urban industries, this is a familiar story. Consider property 
development. Local governments routinely require developers to build 
affordable housing or rent-restricted apartment units in return for favorable 
zoning changes or tax benefits.303 Such requirements are best thought of the 
“price of entry” into a city’s housing market, allowing cities to provide cheap 
apartments in new development to people who could not otherwise afford 
them, a redistributive measure that might otherwise be infeasible.304 
Just so in the sharing economy, where we already see the beginnings of 
such “transactions.” For instance, in Uber’s fight to get approval to operate in 
Chicago, a key issue has been whether it provides cars in underserved areas 
(and whether it does so as well as traditional cabs).305 Similarly, to fend off 
regulations by the state of New York, Airbnb has advertised both how it 
benefits economically stressed homeowners and how it brings tourism to 
places like the Bronx, which have few traditional hotels.306 
If local governments do condition sharing-firm operations on the provision 
of economic redistribution, three basic questions would emerge: (1) where we 
might see this, (2) what form it might take, and (3) would it be legal? 
In terms of location, larger and more affluent cities would have more 
power to demand redistributive payments of some sort in return for market 
access.307 We also expect to see more exactions in cities otherwise inclined 
toward redistribution due to their social or political makeups. 
In terms of form such redistribution could take, two possibilities are 
salient: requiring direct cash payments, or requiring in-kind benefits. On the 
first count, cities might condition approval for sharing services on a firm’s 
offering help in collecting taxes from network users—an otherwise fiendishly 
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difficult task.308 This approach has already been used in cities like Portland, 
San Francisco, and Amsterdam, which impose such requirements on the 
Airbnb network.309 More directly, cities might simply request direct payment 
in return for the right to operate (though it is unclear if they have the legal 
power to do so).310 
A more interesting possibility, however, is for redistribution-minded cities 
to require in-kind contributions. For instance, cities might condition approval 
for sharing companies on guarantees of service for poor areas. They might 
condition approval on requiring a “living wage” to “gig” employees, giving 
hiring advantages to workers from disadvantaged backgrounds, or reducing 
prices for consumers in certain areas. Cities could even ask firms to roll out 
new services in return for allowing their main business line to operate. For 
example, a city might require Lyft to operate its cut-rate “LyftLine” carpool 
service in exchange for the right to offer premium ride options.311 
Perhaps most strikingly, such regulations may be actively welcomed by 
regulated sharing firms, as the cost of providing such benefits may be lower 
than trying to comply with other regulatory expectations of city governments. 
Providing employment and opportunities to vulnerable sub-populations could 
allow sharing firms to both burnish their image and gain political allies to 
further entrench their operations.312 
Yet notwithstanding the “win–win” potential of such measures, one might 
imagine several challenges to such efforts. On a direct level, state law might 
limit local authority to request direct payments from sharing firms.313 More 
fundamentally, such exactions may violate the Takings Clause; in an 
analogous context, the Supreme Court has held cities can only require 
developers to pay “exactions” so long as such expenses have a direct “nexus” 
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to a property use and the payment is “proportional.”314 Some types of 
redistributive sharing exactions would likely run afoul of such strictures. 
Of course, this discussion omits a fourth, crucial question: should cities (as 
opposed to state or federal government) engage in redistribution at all? This is 
not our focus, as for good or ill, local governments do engage in substantial 
redistribution, both across populations and across neighborhoods.315 
That said, it is worth flagging two final normative concerns. First, as with 
more traditional exactions, a question of horizontal equity arises: why should 
new entrants be expected to pay for redistribution if existing firms are not (i.e., 
why make Lyft shoulder the costs of serving poorer neighborhoods and not 
incumbent taxis)? Second, any effort at taxing sharing services will make 
those services more expensive. Just as affordable housing requirements 
provide cheap apartments to some by raising the cost of market-rate housing, 
redistributive requirements on sharing firms may increase prices. As with any 
redistributive policy, this balance will need to be carefully considered. 
C. Like Uber, but for Government Services: The Sharing Economy as a 
Government Contractor 
Finally, we predict a third new relationship between sharing firms and 
local governments: that of government contractor for municipal services.316 
Already, sharing firms provide services to city governments from car rentals to 
disaster preparation logistics. This trend will likely continue and expand. At 
the same time, government contracts could give city governments further 
leverage over sharing firms, allowing them to require stronger consumer 
protections, deeper economic redistribution, or to achieve other policy aims. 
There is an important set of expensive goods and services that cities 
require—but only infrequently. Municipal employees need government-
provided cars, but these cars spend most of their time in parking lots. Cities 
need road-paving machines for post-winter street repair, but not for most of 
the year. School buildings are needed for nine hours a day, but can sit largely 
unused for fifteen. In short, cities face precisely the types of idle-capacity 
dynamics that make for ideal sharing economy consumers. 
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This has not gone unnoticed. Even today, many local governments use car-
share companies to cut the cost of providing city vehicles. Boston, Houston, 
and Washington D.C., and even federal agencies like the General Service 
Administration, have contracted with Zipcar to run their car fleets as car-
sharing operations among government workers.317 Meanwhile, cities like 
Chicago pay for Zipcar or other car-share memberships on behalf of city 
employees.318 For its part, San Francisco is considering abandoning its entire 
non-emergency fleet in favor of car sharing.319 
But car-shares are only the beginning. A service called Munirent has 
emerged in Michigan and Oregon, allowing governments to share all sorts of 
government-owned, heavy-duty property.320 Intergovernmental agreements in 
Oregon effectively allow for the same thing, with municipalities sharing 
everything from road stripping trucks to cold planers. Eventually, sharing 
platforms like Munirent could allow cities to share employees as well, 
allowing cities to share the costs of not only specialized equipment but also the 
cost of hiring a highly trained employee to operate the equipment. And in the 
future, such platforms might expand further still, to allow the government to 
share goods owned by the general public (i.e., to readily rent privately owned 
cameras, private parking lots, or other useful property). Doing so could greatly 
expand the number and kinds of things the government might rent instead of 
buying, leading to reduced costs. 
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Yet another possibility is using sharing firms to provide the government 
with valuable data. Taxi-sharing firms like Uber and Lyft produce and own a 
huge amount of information about where people want to go and leave and 
when, which could aid everything from public transportation routing to land 
use planning.321 Uber has begun sharing this data with cities,322 and it is not 
hard to imagine governments either requiring other sharing economy firms to 
turn over data in return for market access or purchasing it. 
As a preview of things to come, consider the evolving partnership between 
San Francisco’s Department of Emergency Preparedness and BayShare, an 
advocacy group funded by sharing economy firms to deploy privately owned 
sharing services in response to citywide crises.323 For instance, during a 
natural disaster, the partnership provides Airbnb listings to house those made 
homeless, food sharing sites to coordinate charitable food offers, and Lyft cars 
to transport people away from affected areas, all at lower cost and higher 
efficiency than operating the same services through government coffers.324 
Just as cities might be buyers on sharing sites, they might also become 
sellers, mitigating the costs of capital expenditures. The most widely discussed 
possibility is sharing government buildings. Cities have long made 
government buildings like schools available to private groups after hours, 
whether for free or for rent.325 Listing them on popular sharing websites might 
greatly expand the market for such services, presumably generating additional 
funds. 
Whether as a buyer or a seller, government participation in the sharing 
economy raises important legal, political, and policy questions. First, 
government contracting is often governed by complex regimes imposing a 
bevy of conditions and requirements on contractors (such as minority set-
asides, transparency rules, and low-bid requirements).326 Contracts with asset-
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hub firms like Zipcar would fit well within this framework. Yet contracts with 
peer-to-peer models might prove far more challenging. To start, it is unclear 
whether compliance would be determined at the “platform level” (i.e., is Lyft 
compliant?) or the “peer level” (i.e., is Tara, the Lyft driver, compliant?). If it 
is the latter, then the rigors of complying with government contract law may 
put peer-to-peer contracting effectively off-limits for governments. Similarly, 
selling or leasing government property often requires compliance with 
considerable regulations along with express political approval, making 
participation as a sharing “seller” potentially cumbersome.327 The same goes 
for services; many state civil service laws bar the privatization of services 
traditionally provided by government employees, posing another limit to the 
ready use of sharing firms as contractors.328 
And even if such limits could legally be circumvented, it is unclear if 
doing so would be sound policy. As with any government spending, removing 
restrictions on privatization risks making “sweetheart deals” more likely, 
delegates key government functions to workers less accountable to the public, 
and otherwise might undermine civil service protections. 
Such contracting would also face stiff opposition from municipal 
employee unions and incumbent government contractors, as the replacement 
of full-time, unionized workers with non-unionized part-timers would be 
deeply controversial. Therefore, all else equal, the use of sharing firms as 
service contractors seems more likely in places where municipal unions are 
weaker.329 
Most city government sharing, however, will likely take the form of goods 
or properties. Here, the major challenge will likely come from contractors 
themselves. Selling goods to governments is big business, and contractors are 
sure to bring substantial muscle to bear in preventing sharing entrants. And 
unlike in other contexts, sharing firms providing goods to city-customers may 
lack access to the “playbook” Uber and others use to rally support: if the 
consumer is the government, such firms will not have the ability to rally a 
mass consumer base. 
In any event, influence is a two-way street. Cities may use the carrot of 
government contracts as a way of achieving the goals discussed above, such as 
income redistribution; if a city offers Zipcar with a rich contract, Zipcar may 
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more willingly accept city demands that it site cars in poor neighborhoods. 
Similarly, a city contract may be enough to get otherwise recalcitrant sharing 
firms to open or expand in the city. Finally, contracts may be a lever to 
achieve regulatory or other interests cities have with sharing economy firms. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Today’s sharing economy is marked by fierce conflicts between new 
sharing firms and entrenched incumbents. Tomorrow’s sharing economy, 
however, is likely to see a markedly different relationship between such firms 
and the governments that regulate them. With this knowledge in mind, both 
cities and sharing firms are going to need to rethink their approach to local 
regulation. 
Two thoughts should guide our thinking about these next steps, one from 
the perspective of city officials, and another from the perspective of the firms 
themselves. City governments approaching sharing regulation should consider 
what they really want from these firms. There are both political and financial 
limits to the costs they can impose, with the result that the adoption of the 
more nuanced strategies outlined above could mean de-emphasizing the 
current priorities of consumer protection (or incumbent protectionism). City 
officials should thus carefully consider whether today’s priorities provide the 
biggest policy or political benefits they can achieve. Given the possibilities 
sketched in this piece, the menu of options is broader than most officials have 
considered to date. 
On the firm side, investors have showered sharing firms with huge 
amounts of capital. For even the most successful, it is unclear how they are 
going to justify their mammoth valuations. One possibility, suggested by this 
Article, is to become less oppositional to local governments, and in fact, to 
seek rents and contracts through lobbying and bidding rather than engaging 
exclusively in defense against local regulation. 
Finally, citizens and analysts alike need to think hard about the normative 
implications that these new structures could have both for cities and for 
sharing firms themselves. We have (for the most part) avoided trying to 
answer the question of what the best policies are towards sharing regulation. 
We have done so for a reason. It is hard to know in the abstract, without data 
and specific applications in specific cities. But having sketched some possible 
futures, we all must now consider which—if any—our cities should pursue. 
  
